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 In recent years, common ownership has enjoyed 
unprecedented favour among policy-makers and citi-
zens in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Con-
servation land trusts, affordable-housing co-operatives, 
community gardens, and neighbourhood-managed 
parks are spreading throughout major cities. Norma-
tively, these common-ownership regimes are seen as 
yielding a variety of benefits, such as a communitarian 
ethos in the efficient use of scarce resources, or greater 
freedom to interact and create in new ways. The de-
sign of common-ownership regimes, however, requires 
difficult trade-offs. Most importantly, successful 
achievement of the goals of common-ownership re-
gimes requires the limitation of individual co-owners’ 
ability to freely use the common resource, as well as to 
exit the common-ownership arrangement.  
 This article makes two contributions. First, at 
the normative level, it argues that common ownership 
has the potential to help foster greater “equality of au-
tonomy”. By “equality of autonomy”, I mean more eq-
uitable access to the material and relational means 
that allow individuals to be autonomous. Second, at 
the level of design, this article argues that the difficult 
trade-offs of common-ownership regimes should be 
dealt with by grounding the commitment to equality of 
autonomy in the context of specific resources. In some 
cases, this resource-specific design helps to minimize 
or avoid difficult trade-offs. In hard cases, where trade-
offs cannot be avoided, this article offers arguments for 
privileging greater equality of autonomy over full neg-
ative freedom. 
 Au cours de ces dernières années, la propriété com-
mune a joui d’un avantage sans précédent auprès des déci-
deurs politiques et des citoyens des États-Unis, du Canada 
et d’Europe. Le nombre de fiducies de préservation de ter-
rains, de logements abordables, de coopératives, de jardins 
communaux et de parcs gérés par des quartiers est en 
croissance dans toutes les grandes villes. D’un point de vue 
normatif, ces régimes de propriétés communes impliquent 
de nombreux bénéfices, comme l’esprit communautaire de 
l’utilisation efficace de ressources peu abondantes, ou la 
plus grande liberté d’interagir et de créer de façons nou-
velles. La conception du régime de propriété commune, ce-
pendant, demande des compromis difficiles. Plus important 
encore, pour atteindre avec succès les objectifs des régimes 
de propriété commune, il faut limiter la capacité des copro-
priétaires individuels à utiliser la ressource commune li-
brement ainsi que celle de sortir de l’arrangement de pro-
priété commune. 
 Cet article a deux rôles. Premièrement, au niveau 
normatif, il présente l’argument que la propriété commune 
a le potentiel d’encourager une plus grande « égalité 
d’autonomie ». Par « égalité d’autonomie », je veux dire un 
accès plus équitable aux moyens relationnels et matériels 
qui permettent à un individu d’être autonome. Deuxième-
ment, au niveau de la conception, cet article avance que les 
compromis difficiles des régimes de propriété commune de-
vraient être gérés en renforçant l’engagement à l’égalité 
d’autonomie dans le contexte de ressources spécifiques. 
Dans certains cas, cette conception contextuelle pour les 
ressources spécifiques aide à minimiser ou éviter de durs 
compromis. Dans les cas difficiles où les compromis ne peu-
vent être évités, cet article offre des arguments pour privi-
légier une plus grande égalité d’autonomie plutôt que des 
libertés négatives complètes. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2456646 
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Introduction 
 For a long time, common ownership had little appeal in Western lib-
eral democracies. In the collective imagination, common ownership was 
associated with nightmares of Soviet peasants forced into kolkhozes and 
deprived of their land, and with homeowners losing their homes to organ-
izations of tenants.1 Political and legal culture in the United States has 
been particularly unsympathetic to common ownership. The story of 
common ownership in America is the story of closing the open, rural land-
scape of early America.2 It is the story of courts’ reluctance to protect citi-
zens’ common rights in tidal water resources.3 It is the story of the mid-
nineteenth-century development of a system of property rights in the Cal-
ifornia gold mines, earlier treated as a commons.4 And it is the story of the 
extraordinary flourish, followed by the failure, of the utopian religious 
communities committed to communal ownership.5 The commons were also 
unpopular among scholars, who were still influenced by pessimistic ac-
counts, such as Hardin’s allegory of the “tragedy of the commons”6 and 
Demsetz’s unidirectional theory of property evolution7 from the commons 
to private property regimes. 
 In recent years, however, common ownership has enjoyed unprece-
dented favour. The limitations of zoning, taxation, and other public land-
use control measures as means for regulation and redistribution have in-
duced policy-makers and citizens to turn to a long-neglected private law 
tool, common property, with new interest.8 Community land trusts have 
                                                  
1   See e.g. Samuel Kucherov, “Property in the Soviet Union” (1962) 11:3 Am J Comp L 376 
at 376-78. 
2   See e.g. Eric T Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the Owner-
ship of Land (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007) at 29-31. 
3   See e.g. Lynda L Butler, “The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern 
Relevance” (1982) 23:4 Wm & Mary L Rev 835. 
4   See Andrea G McDowell, “From Commons to Claims: Property Rights in the California 
Gold Rush” (2002) 14:1 Yale JL & Human 1. 
5   See e.g. Carol Weisbrod, The Boundaries of Utopia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).  
6   Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162:3859 (13 December 1968) 
1243. 
7   Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57:2 Am Econ Rev 347. 
8   For example, organizers of the Harvard Law Review’s 2011–12 symposium on “The 
New Private Law” note that “[s]ince the rise of Legal Realism and the modern adminis-
trative state, the standard academic supposition in this country has been that ‘all law is 
public law,’ and that any use of the category of private law is unhelpful or pernicious. 
‘The New Private Law’ argues that while the Realist critique of private law has been 
richly generative, it has also caused us to lose sight of entire domains of law and legal 
study” (Harvard Law Review, 2011–12 Symposium: The New Private Law (21 October 
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experimented with distributing the costs and benefits of land development 
through common ownership rather than through taxation. Conservation 
land trusts rely on common-ownership schemes to preserve open space or 
protect ecological resources. Affordable-housing co-operatives are increas-
ingly seen as successful means for making good-quality affordable housing 
available to medium- and low-income buyers. Community gardens and 
neighbourhood-managed parks, where groups of private citizens reclaim 
vacant urban open spaces as commons, are spreading in US cities.  
 Scholars have also dropped their “tragic” views. An “antitragedy” view 
first emerged among political scientists, ecologists, and anthropologists, 
who argued that Hardin’s thesis lacked “historical, theoretical, or cultural 
veracity.”9 Antitragedy views have now become popular among property 
scholars as well. Numerous antitragedy articles have appeared in law re-
views.10 The 2011 edition of the Common Core of European Private Law 
conference was called Commons Core,11 and the famous Max Planck Insti-
tute has established a department devoted to the research on collective 
goods.12 Among supranational decision makers, “the [World] Bank is also 
deeply engaged in, and on the cutting edge of, commons discourse.”13  
 That common ownership is in vogue in some circles does not prove 
that it is the only or the best form of ownership. Contrary to what some 
might suggest, however, this article argues that common property is 
much more than a passing fancy. It addresses the questions of why and 
when common ownership is a good option.  
 In the new commons discourse, common-ownership regimes hold out 
the promise of realizing a variety of desirable values: democratic and re-
sponsible management of natural resources; participatory production of 
diverse cultural artifacts and information; and efficient use of scarce re-
sources when changes in prices or transaction costs make private proper-
      
2011), online: Harvard Law Review <http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues///_8348. 
php>). 
9   Michael Goldman, “‘Customs in Common’: The Epistemic World of the Commons Schol-
ars” (1997) 26:1 Theory and Society 1 at 4. 
10   See e.g. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2001) 110:4 Yale 
LJ 549. 
11   See the conference program: Ugo Mattei & Mauro Bussani, eds, The Common Core of 
European Private Law 17th General Meeting: The Commons Core (Turin: International 
University College of Turin, 2011), online: The Common Core of European Private Law 
<http://www.common-core.org/doc/meeting_17_brochure_V05.pdf>.  
12   Online: The Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods <http://www.coll. 
mpg.de/>.  
13   Goldman, supra note 9 at 7. 
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ty inefficient.14 The idea that common ownership could deliver greater 
economic equality, however, has been largely absent from this new com-
mons discourse. This is a puzzling absence: the word “commons” has al-
ways had “a special resonance in political theory,” embedded with themes 
of “equality and inclusiveness”.15 Further, with Occupy Wall Street in the 
headlines and statistics showing that twenty per cent of Americans con-
trol about eighty-five per cent of American wealth, the concern for equali-
ty is gaining centrality in the public discourse.16  
 This article argues that common ownership has the potential to help 
foster greater “equality of autonomy”, by which I mean more equitable ac-
cess to the material and relational means that allow individuals to be au-
tonomous. I turn, for inspiration, to late nineteenth-century Europe, 
where policy-makers and law professors revised earlier, pessimistic ideas 
about the inevitable failure of common ownership and instead debated its 
potential. Their debate stands as a rare moment when conservatives and 
progressives alike talked about property law in a new way—as a means of 
equalizing, rather than maximizing, the enjoyment of autonomy. They set 
aside the focus on protecting the individual owner’s autonomy that had 
characterized property debates since the Enlightenment and the rise of 
liberalism. Instead, they privileged the idea that collective landownership 
could make the autonomy that derives from owning land available on a 
more equal basis.17 
                                                  
14   See the literature discussed in Part I, below.  
15   Wendy J Gordon, “Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons” (2010) 95:4 
Cornell L Rev 733 at 754. From Karl Marx’s Rheinische Zeitung articles on the debates 
on the law on thefts of wood before the Rhineland Assembly (Karl Marx, “Third Article: 
Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood”, translated by Clemens Dutt in Karl Marx 
Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975) vol 1) to 
E.P. Thompson’s work on the “moral economy” of the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century (Customs in Common (New York: New Press, 1993) ch IV), the commons have 
been seen as providing the poor with access to necessities or a little surplus income.  
16   See G William Domhoff, “Power in America: Wealth, Income, and Power” (October 
2012), online: Who Rules America? <http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/ 
wealth.html>. See also Michael I Norton & Dan Ariely, “Building a Better America—
One Wealth Quintile at a Time” (2011) 6:1 Perspectives on Psychological Science 9 at 
11, figure 2.  
17   A terminological premise is needed. I will use the term “collective ownership” when dis-
cussing the European nineteenth-century debate and “common ownership” when refer-
ring to present debates. European jurists talked about “collective ownership” and dis-
tinguished it from simple co-ownership. Co-ownership, or communio, was the concept 
that European continental jurists had traditionally used to deal with proprietary situa-
tions involving more than one owner. The form of collective ownership that French and 
Italian scholars sought to restore and expand in the late nineteenth century differed 
from co-ownership in three respects. To start with, in co-ownership each co-owner’s 
right was seen as analogous to that of an individual owner and was described through 
 
268   (2012) 58:2  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
 The notion of equality of autonomy that I propose differs from conven-
tional arguments about the autonomy afforded by property rights in two 
respects. First, I suggest a different notion of autonomy. The autonomy 
that most advocates of full property rights have in mind is “negative free-
dom”, that is, the absence of external restraints imposed by the state or 
voluntarily placed by others.18 By contrast, the autonomy that common 
ownership fosters is a “thicker” or multi-dimensional type of autonomy, 
      
the idea of a share. In collective ownership, by contrast, an organic group of owners ex-
ercised a unitary right, unsusceptible to being quantified by shares. Second, while co-
ownership was a temporary condition, in that each co-owner could, at any moment, ask 
for the partition, collective ownership was not temporary and could not be divided upon 
request by a group member. Finally, while in the case of co-ownership, each co-owner 
could freely transfer her share, in collective ownership, the pool of potential transferees 
was variously limited. For a discussion of condominium and collective ownership, see 
Francesco Filomusi-Guelfi, Enciclopedia Giuridica [Legal Encyclopedia], 5th ed (Na-
ples: N Jovene, 1907) at 245-53. As for the present debate in the United States, while to 
be technically precise, ownership regimes can be arranged along a spectrum ranging 
from open access to individually owned private property, most literature uses, for the 
sake of simplicity, “commons” or “common ownership”. Among those who classify prop-
erty regimes on the basis of the number of owners, Margaret McKean distinguishes be-
tween (a) unowned or open-access property, where “no one has rights and ... no poten-
tial user can be excluded,” for example the high seas or unclaimed lands; (b) public 
property—property “held in trust for the public by the state, to which the general public 
... has access,” for example, national parks; (c) state property—the “exclusive ... and 
therefore private ... property of government bodies,” for example, government offices; (d) 
jointly owned private property, where “co-owners may sell their shares at will without 
consulting the other co-owners,” for example some agricultural co-ops, business part-
nerships, or joint stock corporations; (e) common property where “all co-owners may 
simultaneously agree to sell by an agreed-upon voting rule but individual co-owners can 
sell, trade or lease their shares ... only in accordance with very stringent rules laid down 
by the group”; (f) individually owned private property (Margaret A McKean, “Success on 
the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Re-
source Management” (1992) 4:3 Journal of Theoretical Politics 247 at 250-52). Stephen 
Munzer provides a somewhat different classification, distinguishing between (a) open 
access: “anyone may come in and take out units of the resource, but no person has an 
exclusive right to sell or manage the resource,” for example, a fishery; (b) common prop-
erty: the co-owners “individually have rights of entry and withdrawal and collectively 
have rights to manage or sell the resource and to exclude nonmembers”; (c) semicom-
mons: “a mix of common and private rights in which each set of rights has a significant 
impact on the other”; (d) anticommons: “an asset from which each person has a ... [right] 
to exclude” and no one, a right “to use without permission of others” (Stephen R Mun-
zer, “Commons, Anticommons, and Community in Biotechnological Assets” (2009) 10:1 
Theor Inq L 271 at 273.  
18   See John Christman, The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Owner-
ship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 68-70 [Christman, Myth of Property]. 
Christman notes that arguments defending (liberal) ownership on the basis of liberty 
rest on a negative notion of liberty as “the relative absence of external physical re-
straints that prevent agents from acting on their actual desires” (ibid at 68). On the 
cognitive conditions for autonomy (i.e., for individual desires to count as autonomously 
chosen), see ibid at 162-66. 
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one that many have proposed in recent debates within liberalism.19 It in-
volves the availability of means that enable individuals to be autono-
mous.20 Autonomy requires, along with negative freedom, positive free-
dom, that is, the basic material resources (a home, food, education) that 
enable us to have a meaningful set of options.21 Further, to be autono-
mous, we need the ability to communicate and debate ideas in order to 
make, and take responsibility for, choices that we feel are authentically 
“our own”.22 Second, I am concerned with patterns of distribution of au-
tonomy. If this thicker autonomy is important for human flourishing, then 
it should be distributed more equally.  
                                                  
19   The idea of equality of autonomy that I propose is grounded in the concept of value plu-
ralism. For a discussion of value pluralism in property law, see Gregory S Alexander, 
“Pluralism and Property” (2011) 80:3 Fordham L Rev 1017 (pluralists hold that “there 
may be multiple values that are equally valid and equally fundamental and that these 
values sometimes conflict with each other” at 1020). Alexander distinguishes between 
different forms of pluralism. “Foundational pluralism” holds that “pluralism exists all 
the way down to the most basic level so that there is no single value by which we can 
judge the goodness of all other values” (ibid at 1021). “Normative pluralism” holds that 
“[t]here is a plurality of good-transmitters, or value-bearers, but only one foundational 
good that they all bear. Thus, one may think that aggregate well-being is the founda-
tional intrinsic good but also believe that there are many bearers of well-being” (ibid 
[footnote omitted]). Using Alexander’s typology of pluralisms, the notion of autonomy 
that I propose is grounded in normative pluralism: there is one good—autonomy—and 
several good transmitters—negative freedom, positive freedom, and relational autono-
my.  
20   On the multi-dimensionality of “real” or “thick” freedom, see memorandum from Talha 
Syed to Anna di Robilant, “Equality of What?: The Key Options” [nd] [Syed, “Equality of 
What?”]. See also John Christman & Joel Anderson, “Introduction” in John Christman 
& Joel Anderson, eds, Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 1 [Christman & Anderson, “Introduc-
tion”; Christman & Anderson, Challenges to Liberalism]. 
21   See Christman, Myth of Property, supra note 18 at 162-74. Christman argues that one 
must have the “minimal ability to consider options, gather information, and reason 
normally. ... Therefore, one must have access to education, health care, and welfare 
conditions (such as housing)” (ibid at 163). He continues: “In addition, it must be the 
case that a person’s living conditions are such that she is able to turn her attention to 
the variety of choices and opportunities that are relevant to her self-development,” 
meaning that she is “not constantly straining with other elements of one’s survival,” 
such as “minimal housing and welfare needs” (ibid). See also Joel Anderson & Axel 
Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice” in Christman & Ander-
son, Challenges to Liberalism, supra note 20, 127. Anderson and Honneth suggest that, 
for individuals to be autonomous, we need to minimize their vulnerabilities, hence the 
emphasis on equality and access to participation in the relations of recognition through 
which individuals acquire autonomy. 
22   See e.g. John Christman, The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-
historical Selves (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) ch 8 [Christman, 
Politics of Persons]. 
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 Common-ownership regimes such as affordable-housing co-operatives 
and community gardens promote greater equality in the latter two di-
mensions of autonomy. First, they provide co-owners with a relational 
network that facilitates “authentic” choices. Second, they are an im-
portant item in any package of policy proposals that ensure equality of ac-
cess to basic resources such as housing or green space, and their related 
social and health benefits.  
 The commitment to equality of autonomy also offers guidance regard-
ing the central challenge of common-ownership design: the tension be-
tween equality and negative freedom. Can common-ownership regimes be 
both egalitarian and liberal? In other words, can housing co-operatives or 
community gardens be effective in advancing greater equality in the ma-
terial and relational dimensions of autonomy while also fully protecting 
co-owners’ negative freedom, in particular, their ability to exit common-
ownership regimes? For common ownership not to be second-class owner-
ship, individual co-owners need to have negative freedom (i.e., some mar-
gin for autonomous-use decisions, as well as the ability to freely exit the 
common-ownership arrangement). Historical and comparative studies, 
however, show that the experiments with common ownership that were 
the most successful in achieving high levels of equality, such as the Israeli 
kibbutzes or the utopian religious communities in the United States, were 
so because they limited members’ negative freedom.23  
 This trade-off between negative freedom and equality has been dealt 
with in one of two ways. Some invoke consent: co-owners have freely con-
sented to limits on use and exit. By contrast, Hanoch Dagan and Michael 
Heller have proposed the “liberal commons”, a default regime applicable 
to a wide set of common-ownership regimes, from marital property to 
business partnerships, that satisfactorily balance the difficult trade-offs 
between co-owners’ ability to exit and the egalitarian or relational re-
wards of common ownership.24 I argue that neither answer is fully con-
vincing. The former raises difficult questions about the economic and so-
cial constraints on consent. The latter fails to discuss the hard cases 
where trade-offs simply cannot be avoided. 
 I argue that these conflicts between negative freedom and equality 
should be dealt with by privileging the commitment to equality of auton-
omy. The approach that I propose negotiates the difficult trade-offs be-
tween greater equality and less negative freedom for co-owners in the con-
                                                  
23   See e.g. Ran Abramitzky, “The Limits of Equality: An Economic Analysis of the Israeli 
Kibbutz” (2007) 67:2 The Journal of Economic History 495; Robert C Ellickson, “Proper-
ty in Land” (1993) 102:6 Yale LJ 1315. 
24   Supra note 10. 
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text of specific resources. It looks at the peculiar characteristics of hous-
ing, urban land, or water, and it weighs the plural values and interests 
they implicate. In some cases, this resource-specific design helps to mini-
mize or avoid difficult trade-offs. In hard cases where trade-offs cannot be 
avoided, I make arguments for privileging greater equality of positive and 
relational autonomy over full negative freedom.  
 This article is structured in three parts. Part I presents the contempo-
rary debate on the commons and illustrates the central dilemmas in-
volved in the design of common-ownership regimes. Part II turns to the 
European debate of the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries that 
led to the adoption of the 1894 bill on the reorganization of land collectives 
in Italy. It argues that, in this latter debate, socialists and conservatives 
agreed that common ownership could foster greater equality of autonomy. 
Part III presents arguments for foregrounding a similar idea of equality of 
autonomy in the current commons debate and discusses the normative 
and design decisions presented by two common-ownership regimes that 
have the potential to promote greater equality of autonomy: affordable-
housing co-operatives and community gardens. 
I. The Commons Debate 
A. Antitragedy Views and the Benefits of Common Ownership 
  Antitragedy views have gained wide consensus among legal scholars, 
triggering the proliferation of a vast commons literature.25 The debate is 
multi-faceted. It provides explanations for the frequent reversal of the 
Demsetzian path from open access to private property rights. It asks 
which values and goals a commons regime ought to promote and facili-
                                                  
25   See e.g. Stuart Banner, “The Political Function of the Commons: Changing Conceptions 
of Property and Sovereignty in Missouri, 1750-1850” (1997) 41:1 Am J Legal Hist 61; 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, “The Evolution of Private and Open Access 
Property” (2008) 10:1 Theor Inq L 77 [Bell & Parchomovsky, “Evolution”]; Anupam 
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, “The Romance of the Public Domain” (2004) 92:5 Cal L 
Rev 1331; Dagan & Heller, supra note 10; Ellickson, supra note 23; Daniel Fitzpatrick, 
“Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Con-
tested Access” (2006) 115:5 Yale LJ 996; David D Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, “The 
Black Death and Property Rights” (2002) 31:2 J Legal Stud S545; Saul Levmore, “Two 
Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights” (2002) 31:2 J Legal Stud S421; Thomas 
W Merrill, “Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights” 
(2002) 31:2 J Legal Stud S331; Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, 
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property” (1986) 53:3 U Chicago L Rev 711; Henry E 
Smith, “Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights” 
(2002) 31:2 J Legal Stud S453 [Smith, “Exclusion Versus Governance”]; Henry E Smith, 
“Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields” (2000) 29:1 J Legal 
Stud 131 [Smith, “Semicommon Property Rights”]. 
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tate. Finally, it considers which legal rules or design principles would best 
accomplish these goals. Three antitragedy views have emerged, centred 
on community, freedom, and efficiency.  
 A prolific strand of scholarship, inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s work, 
points to the communitarian rewards of common ownership.26 The com-
munitarian view comes in two variants: an “ethno-identitarian” variant 
and a “civic-republican” one. According to the former, a durable regulatory 
scheme would have to reflect and strengthen the social identity of a close-
knit group with shared beliefs, history, or needs. Examples of these close-
knit groups are the “lobster gangs” of Maine, a Swiss alpine community, 
or the Israeli kibbutz. The ethno-identitarian claim is that the ideological 
homogeneity and continuing interaction of group members generate gov-
ernance rules that are conducive to efficient resource management while 
also rewarding other vital concerns, such as community or equality.27 
 According to the latter, civic-republican view, a well-designed common 
property regime may create community where community did not previ-
                                                  
26   Ostrom’s groundbreaking work has triggered a proliferation of methodologically similar 
literature. The fundamental research question for Ostrom focuses on the governance of 
natural resources used by many individuals in common, more precisely “common pool 
resources” (CPR). Ostrom considered two alternative governance models—state control 
and privatization—and proposed an alternative theory of self-organizing and self-
governing forms of collective action to successfully solve provision problems and appro-
priation problems. Ostrom examined a variety of case studies of self-governing institu-
tions to understand the design principles that characterize successful, “long-enduring, 
self-organized, and self-governed CPRs” (Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) at 58 [Ostrom, Governing the Commons]). See ibid at 8-23, 58-101. See also 
Elinor Ostrom, “Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action” in Robert O Keohane 
& Elinor Ostrom, eds, Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and 
Cooperation in Two Domains (London, UK: Sage, 1995) 125 at 151-57.  
27   Robert Ellickson defines a close-knit group as “a social entity within which power is 
broadly dispersed and members have continuing face-to-face interactions with one an-
other. By providing members with both the information and opportunities they need to 
engage in informal social control, conditions in such groups are conducive to coopera-
tion” (supra note 23 at 1320-21). Similarly, Singleton and Taylor argue that groups that 
manage to solve their collective action problems by themselves are those that have 
“community”. By “community” they mean a group with (1) “some shared beliefs”; (2) a 
“more-or-less stable set of members ... who expect to continue interacting with one an-
other for some time to come” and whose relations are “direct (unmediated by third par-
ties) and multiplex”; and (3) mutual vulnerability (i.e., each actor “values something 
which can be contributed or withheld by others in the group and can therefore be used 
as a sanction against that actor”). Community is undermined or weakened by great so-
cial and economic differences among its members such as differences in income, wealth, 
class position, ethnicity, race, caste, language, or religion: see Sara Singleton & Michael 
Taylor, “Common Property, Collective Action and Community” (1992) 4:3 Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 309 at 311, 315.  
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ously exist.28 Proponents of the civic-republican view argue that the inter-
active problem solving of successful commons is also at the “core ... of the 
community development process.”29 Common ownership delivers the de-
sired outcomes of a civic-republican ethos (i.e., participation, deliberation, 
knowledge production, and responsibility). While some proponents of this 
view focus on robust design principles,30 others excavate historical exam-
ples of community building that turned out well.31  
 In contrast to a focus on community, a second strand of commons 
scholarship sees greater freedom as the reward of common ownership. 
The idea that open access may yield greater freedom than traditional pri-
vatization has been central to the intellectual property debate on the pub-
                                                  
28   The civic-republican view became prominent among legal scholars in the late 1980s, 
largely due to two articles written by Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein, respective-
ly. According to Sunstein, the basic republican commitments are to (a) deliberation in 
government, (b) political equality, (c) universality, and (d) citizenship: see Cass R Sun-
stein, “Beyond the Republican Revival” (1988) 97:8 Yale LJ 1539 at 1541-42. Both Sun-
stein and Michelman advocated a modern reconsideration of civic-republican thought. 
Michelman in particular presented a republican constitutional theory as a potential 
means to justify a more robust protection of individual rights by the judiciary: see 
Frank Michelman, “Law’s Republic” (1988) 97:8 Yale LJ 1493. While the heyday of civic 
republicanism was in the 1980s, it has remained influential in the commons literature.  
29   James A Swaney, “Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community” (1990) 24:2 Jour-
nal of Economic Issues 451 at 456. 
30   Elinor Ostrom proposes eight principles of good design: (1) the boundaries of the user 
group and of the resource are clearly defined; (2) the use rules are appropriate given lo-
cal conditions; (3) most users can participate in modifying operational rules; (4) moni-
toring is done by the users themselves or by monitors who are accountable to them; (5) 
sanctions are graduated and are carried out by other users or officials who are account-
able to them, or both; (6) users have easy access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve con-
flicts among users and officials; (7) users have the right to organize their own solutions, 
unchallenged by external government authorities; and (8) the institutional mechanism 
is “organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Governing the Commons, supra 
note 26 at 90, table 3.1). See also Elinor Ostrom, “Community and the Endogenous So-
lution of Commons Problems” (1992) 4:3 Journal of Theoretical Politics 343 at 344-45.  
31   For instance, the chief lesson of the thread of nineteenth-century cases and doctrines of 
“inherently public property” may be that open access to specific resources, such as 
roads, waterways, or beaches, is desirable because it fosters socialization and civic edu-
cation, thereby serving democratic values: see Rose, supra note 25 at 778-80. Similarly, 
a study of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century common grazing lands of St. Louis 
suggests that the commons benefited the residents of St. Louis by performing an im-
portant political function. Namely, “[i]n a Spanish colonial political system that ... 
lacked institutions of self-government, the commons provided ... a mechanism enabling 
the residents to make their own decisions on matters most likely to have an economic 
effect on them” (Banner, supra note 25 at 64). 
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lic domain. With the advent of the “networked information economy”,32 
much of the commons debate has moved from a focus on land to a focus on 
information.33 The growth of intellectual property law and the resulting 
“propertization” of information mean the enclosure of the public domain. 
This enclosure stifles political and cultural freedom. In response, the pub-
lic domain movement seeks to protect the commons of information against 
the encroachment of private property.  
 For its advocates, protection of the public domain promotes freedom in 
a variety of ways.34 It secures the availability of information from “diverse 
and antagonistic sources,” thereby protecting freedom of speech, which in 
turn enables individual self-authorship.35 It also allows individuals to in-
teract and create without restrictions, thereby sustaining innovation and 
                                                  
32   See Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Mar-
kets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) ch 2-4 [Benkler, Wealth of 
Networks]. 
33   See Chander & Sunder, supra note 25 at 1333. For some, “[w]e are in the middle of a 
second enclosure movement, ... ‘the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind’” 
(James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain” (2003) 66:1-2 Law & Contemp Probs 33 at 37). See also Yochai Benkler, “Free 
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the Enclosure of the Pub-
lic Domain” (1999) 74:2 NYUL Rev 354 [Benkler, “Free as the Air”]. For Benkler: 
  The public domain is the range of uses of information that any person is privi-
leged to make absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular 
person unprivileged.  
  Conversely,  
  The enclosed domain is the range of uses of information as to which someone 
has an exclusive right, and that no other person may make absent individualized 
facts that indicate permission from the holder of the right, or otherwise privilege the 
specific use under the stated facts (ibid at 362). 
34   See Jedediah Purdy, “A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradi-
tion for New Debates” (2005) 72:4 U Chicago L Rev 1237 at 1278-81 (for a discussion of 
the different ideas of freedom that underlie the debate). More generally, see David 
Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain” (1981) 44:4 Law & Contemp Probs 147 at 171 
(for an early and visionary formulation of the idea that a robust public domain is condu-
cive to greater freedom). 
35   Benkler, “Free as the Air”, supra note 33 at 366, 394. What Benkler has in mind is 
what, in this article, I call a thick notion of liberal autonomy. In his view, properly de-
signed commons are capable of yielding desiderata that are central to this thicker no-
tion of individual autonomy: enhanced individual capacity to do more for and by oneself, 
a more genuinely participatory political system, social justice in the form of increased 
access to the basic instrumentalities of economic opportunity, as well as a more critical 
and self-reflective culture: see Benkler, Wealth of Networks, supra note 32 at 133-34.  
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productivity. The end result is an active, participatory cultural and civic 
life.36  
 A third strand of commons scholarship shifts the focus from communi-
ty or freedom to efficiency. Law and economics scholars argue that, con-
trary to the Hardinian and Demsetzian narratives, common ownership 
may be efficient in some instances. They focus on variations in transac-
tion costs to make sense of reversals from private property rights to open 
access or common property alternatives. In some cases, changes in rela-
tive prices due to technological advances or other outside causes may ex-
plain the reversal. For example, “[i]nput and output price changes might 
suddenly make farming in a given location ... unprofitable,” inducing 
farmers to cease policing boundaries.37 That lack of policing may reinstate 
a regime of open access for hikers and hunters.38  
 Other law and economics scholars point to historically significant ex-
amples of efficient persistence of semicommon property.39 The “open field” 
system, which displaced earlier, individual tenure in medieval and early 
modern Europe, had significant efficiency benefits. Peasants owned scat-
tered strips of land40 for grain growing but also used the land collectively 
                                                  
36   See Lawrence Lessig, “The Architecture of Innovation” (2002) 51:6 Duke LJ 1783 at 
1789-90.  
37   Levmore, supra note 25 at S423-25. Levmore also provides an alternative explanation 
for the reversal: ibid at S425. Most reversals require some capacity on the part of the 
pre-existing property owners or potential beneficiaries to organize in interest groups. 
For example: 
 [A]fter some wilderness has evolved to a state of privately owned plots, citizens with 
recreational and environmental aims join to advance the cause of a “green belt” that 
will form continuous open space in and around a city. They may succeed in gaining 
legislation or administrative rules that make it difficult for private property owners 
to do much with certain lands (ibid at S246).  
  Such green belt is “unlikely to arise spontaneously” (ibid). “[G]overnmental intervention 
is probably required, and this ... is unlikely without some interest group activity” (ibid 
at S427). This is less of a bright story; it “raises suspicions and can easily be described 
in negative terms. ... Organized minorities ... may have brought about the reemergence 
of a commons even though transaction costs and technological change continues to favor 
evolution toward closed access” (ibid at S428). It is “possible that the change is ineffi-
cient and that it simply reflects the advantage of one interest group over another” (ibid 
at S431). “[A]bsent a good deal of local evidence,” Levmore argues, “we will generally be 
unable to distinguish between these two causes, so we will not know whether to regard 
rearrangements with favor or disfavor” (ibid at S433).  
38   See ibid at S423-25. 
39   See Smith, “Semicommon Property Rights”, supra note 25, at 144-46. See also Smith, 
“Exclusion Versus Governance”, supra note 25 at 478-83.  
40   Smith also notes that scattering is not an “efficiency-decreasing cultural [artifact]” but 
rather is a key to achieving efficiency. Scattering is defined as “a method of boundary 
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for grazing. “This enabled them to take advantage of economies of scale in 
grazing and private incentives in grain growing. ... The semi-commons al-
lowed operation on two scales simultaneously.”41  
 Still others maintain that the number of owners is, along with the con-
figuration of the asset and the scope of dominion, one of the three dimen-
sions of property rights that private actors and policy-makers should ad-
just to maximize property values.42 Examining these three aspects togeth-
er shows how the optimal number of owners is not necessarily one. For 
example, underconsumption and overconsumption costs are a trade-off in 
large-asset management. Single owners may be unable to consume large 
assets on their own; however, reconfiguration into smaller units and pri-
vatization may be far more costly than the potential for overconsumption 
as a commons. Sometimes the latter is the optimal solution.  
 A communitarian ethos, freedom to connect and create, and efficiency 
are newcomers to the commons debate. Historically, the concern with 
greater economic equality has been central to experiments with common 
ownership. In Europe, between the twelfth and the nineteenth centuries, 
use rights on common village lands or land collectives provided the poor-
est layer of the rural population with resources such as timber or forage, 
and at times, with a small income.43 Interestingly, equality has remained 
largely absent from the contemporary commons debate. 
B. The Fundamental Design Problem of Common Ownership: The Trade-
Off Between Different Kinds of Freedom 
 In their 2001 article, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller made a fresh 
start in the commons debate by highlighting and addressing the funda-
mental problem of common-ownership regimes. Can the commons be lib-
eral? Can a commons regime successfully promote the end envisioned, be 
it “community” or “efficiency”, while also protecting individual co-owners’ 
negative freedom (i.e., their ability to change their minds, pursue new 
ends, and eventually, leave)? Until now, legal scholars and policy-makers 
      
placement that functions as a sanction on the picking and choosing of parcels associated 
with strategic behavior” (“Semicommon Property Rights”, supra note 25 at 133).  
41   Ibid at 132. 
42   See Bell & Parchomovsky, “Evolution”, supra note 25 at 78-79. See also Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, “Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions” (2008) 75:3 U 
Chicago L Rev 1015 at 1037. 
43   On the role of the commons as social safety net, see generally Martina De Moor, Leigh 
Shaw-Taylor & Paul Warde, “Comparing the Historical Commons of North West Eu-
rope: An Introduction” in Martina De Moor, Leigh Shaw-Taylor & Paul Warde, eds, The 
Management of Common Land in North West Europe, c. 1500-1850 (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepolis, 2002) 15 at 19-22; Thompson, supra note 15.  
                                 COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EQUALITY OF AUTONOMY  277 
 
 
have relied on design principles that make happy solutions difficult to im-
agine. By and large, they have favoured the protection of the interests of 
co-owners as a group at the expense of liberal exit.44 And historically, to 
liberal eyes, the communes that have achieved their goals appear utterly 
illiberal;45 their success has depended upon limiting their individual 
members’ exit options. For example, to achieve a high degree of equality 
while also preventing adverse selection, the kibbutz movement has made 
exit costly by requiring departing members to forfeit all, or almost all, of 
their claims to the group’s joint assets.46  
 Dagan and Heller argue that happy solutions are possible and that 
there is no need for difficult trade-offs between co-owners’ negative free-
dom and other substantive values. They have translated their commit-
ment to liberal autonomy into a regime of default rules.47 Minor fine tun-
ing makes these rules applicable to a substantial subset of common-
ownership settings, such as marital property, partnerships, condomini-
ums, and close corporations. This regime, the liberal commons, facilitates 
efficient communitarian co-operation while also protecting a whole family 
of rights based on negative freedom, such as exit, dissociation, the right to 
mobility, and the right to a fair share of the common resource.  
 For example, applied to marital property, the liberal commons regime 
reinforces commitment to the marital community, where spouses share 
with each other without reference to individual desert. At the same time, 
                                                  
44   See Dagan & Heller, supra note 10 at 551-52. 
45   See Ellickson, supra note 23 at 1344.  
46   See Abramitzky, supra note 23 at 495-96. See also Ellickson, supra note 23 (“[a] com-
mune that succeeds in promoting equality and thick social ties simultaneously imping-
es upon the classical-liberal values of individual liberty, privacy, and self-
determination” at 1352).  
47   Rules in the sphere of individual dominion (Dagan & Heller, supra note 10 at 582-90) 
“counteract the potentially devastating effects that individual autonomy may have on 
the efficiency—even the viability—of common ownership” (ibid at 590). The aim is to 
deter overuse by setting restrictive limits on exploitation, tailored to the specific re-
source, and to prevent underinvestment through investment protection rules. Rules in 
the sphere of democratic self-governance (ibid at 590-96) seek to secure community and 
autonomy by supporting the commoners’ co-operation and amplifying each co-owner’s 
voice (i.e., ability to influence management from within). Besides procedural norms re-
lating to disclosure, fair hearing, and consultation, Dagan and Heller suggest broad ma-
jority-rule jurisdiction for decisions that increase the pie and sharp limits on majority 
rule for decisions characterized as redistributive. Finally, and most importantly, rules 
regulating exit (ibid at 596-601) aim at protecting individual autonomy while prevent-
ing opportunistic behaviour and enhancing co-operation. This is achieved through three 
mechanisms: short cooling-off periods, reasonable exit taxes, and rights of first refusal. 
278   (2012) 58:2  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
the regime protects the individual spouse’s negative freedom.48 As an il-
lustration, consider the difficult question of the proper division of a 
spouse’s future earning potential gained during marriage. Those who care 
about protection of the marital community may favour the principle that 
academic degrees are marital assets subject to equal division. A key objec-
tion to that principle arises from negative freedom: the spouse who re-
ceived the degree during the marriage would be locked into a career after 
the marriage. For example, a medical student might be obliged to practice 
as a physician in order to pay her former spouse half of the earning poten-
tial that they generated together.49 A liberal commons regime solves the 
dilemma with the rule that the increased earning capacity is only subject 
to division after it is exercised and earnings are realized. Division safe-
guards community by recognizing that the development of careers during 
marriage is centrally collective, but dividing only what is realized in order 
to allow the spouse to make autonomous choices in the future.50  
 Dagan and Heller’s liberal commons is an ambitious experiment in in-
stitutional design, but happy solutions to difficult trade-offs are not al-
ways possible. Take, for example, affordable-housing co-operatives, a form 
of common ownership that “has been edging closer to the policy main-
stream in recent years.”51 They occupy “the fertile middle ground between 
arid dichotomies that have historically dominated American housing poli-
cy,” where housing has had to be either publicly or privately owned.52 Typ-
ically, ownership is split between a non-profit entity and the residents 
who own shares in the co-op. The residents’ shares give occupancy rights 
but also come with obligations and limitations concerning aspects of the 
co-owners’ autonomy, specifically the right to transfer and the right to 
use.53 The right to transfer gives way to resale restrictions: “[o]ften, in ex-
change for very favourable public financing, [residents] ... must agree to 
restrictions on the amount of equity [they] ... can retain when the unit is 
sold.”54 These limits are meant to keep the unit affordable and hence 
                                                  
48   See Carolyn J Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, “Properties of Marriage” (2004) 104:1 Colum L 
Rev 75 at 78. 
49  See ibid at 110. 
50   See ibid at 111-12. 
51   John Emmeus Davis, Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Re-
sale-Restricted, Owner-Occupied Housing (Montclair, NJ: National Housing Institute, 
2006) at 1, online: National Housing Institute <http://www.nhi.org/research/522/ 
shared_equity_homeownership/>. 
52   Ibid. 
53   See ibid. 
54   Michael Diamond, “The Meaning and Nature of Property: Homeownership and Shared 
Equity in the Context of Poverty” (2009) 29:1 St Louis U Pub L Rev 85 at 89 (in the con-
text of limited equity co-operatives). See also Duncan Kennedy, “The Limited Equity 
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available to other low-income buyers. There may also be constraints on 
who may buy units: for instance, the co-op may have a right of first re-
fusal in order to allow it to purchase the unit for resale to buyers who are 
of low-income status.55 Further, there may be limits on the right to pass 
the property on at death.56  
 Use entitlements are limited as well. First, owners are required to oc-
cupy the property,57 and subletting is regulated or restricted.58 Second, 
while residents have the right to manage the property, they may be sub-
ject to review by the non-profit entity, in order to prevent gold plating, de-
terioration, or abusive or discriminatory management.59  
 These limits on co-owners’ negative freedom (i.e., on the right to freely 
use, transfer, and exit) vary in nature and in justification. The inability to 
pass one’s share on at death is severe. Other limits are less invasive. Con-
sent requirements, for instance, may amount to a mere reasonableness 
analysis not uncommon in common-interest communities, such as condo-
miniums. Some limits, though motivated by concerns that may be criti-
cized as paternalistic, are necessary to ensure the effectiveness and viabil-
ity of the project. They reflect a trade-off between full autonomy for cur-
rent co-owners and greater equality in access to housing for present and 
future middle- and low-income buyers. These trade-offs are nevertheless 
difficult because co-owners’ negative-freedom interests are extremely 
weighty: compelling arguments can be made to support design principles 
that fully reflect these interests.60 
 In the case of marital property, the happier solutions of the liberal 
commons seem convincing but more difficult to achieve. Marriage delivers 
“unique goods” (e.g., intimacy, caring, and commitment) that are im-
portant to the individual spouses’ self-fulfillment but are also collective in 
nature.61 Sacrifices of a spouse’s individual autonomy, such as the division 
of marital property on the basis of an equal-division rule rather than an 
      
Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society” (2002) 
46:1 How LJ 85 at 85-99; Duncan Kennedy & Leopold Specht, “Limited Equity Housing 
Cooperatives as a Mode of Privatization” in Gregory S Alexander & Graİyna SkĈpska, 
eds, A Fourth Way? Privatization, Property, and the Emergence of New Market Econo-
mies (New York: Routledge, 1994) 267 at 271. 
55   See Davis, supra note 51 at 14. 
56   See ibid at 60. 
57   See ibid at 14. 
58   See Kennedy & Specht, supra note 54 at 271. 
59   See Kennedy, supra note 54 at 100. 
60   See generally Dagan & Heller, supra note 10. 
61   Frantz & Dagan, supra note 48 at 81-88. 
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individual-contribution principle, are entirely consistent with, and reflec-
tive of, this vision of marriage. 
 By contrast, the constraints on members’ negative freedom that are 
typical of affordable-housing co-operatives may appear more puzzling and 
harder to justify. These communities differ from the liberal egalitarian 
community of marriage in several respects. First, they are large and het-
erogeneous. The intimate partial fusion of the marital couple is made pos-
sible by a commonality of emotions, interests, and projects. But members 
of an affordable-housing co-operative have widely diverse life plans. They 
belong to different layers of the worse off, entailing differences in aspira-
tions and in prospects for socio-economic success. Some have the desire 
and ability for social mobility, while others are less upwardly mobile for 
cultural or socio-economic reasons.62 Second, while marriage is usually 
conceptualized as voluntary, entry into an affordable-housing co-operative 
involves an aspect of coercion due to material insecurity and a limited 
availability of options. Would-be home owners with low incomes typically 
have a choice between home ownership under an affordable-housing re-
gime or renting.63 In Chicago, for example, limited equity co-operatives 
“have attracted and retained a population with an income that is too low 
to enter the private housing market, but too high for [them to qualify for] 
most subsidized housing.”64 Third, while spouses commit to a long-term 
marital project, members of affordable-housing communities envision dif-
ferent time horizons. Changes in a variety of life circumstances may make 
easier and less costly exit options more important.65 Finally, while the 
unique goods that spouses expect from marriage are inherently collective, 
members of affordable-housing co-operatives rely on the benefits of co-
operation and community while also seeking highly individualistic goods 
such as wealth accumulation and privacy. Housing is an economic good,66 
but it is also a guarantee of privacy, safety, and freedom.67 
                                                  
62   See Kennedy, supra note 54 at 103, 110. 
63   See Diamond, supra note 54 at 105. 
64   Davis, supra note 51 at 94. 
65   See Dagan & Heller, supra note 10 at 567-70 (discussing the costs of being locked in). 
For the limited equity co-operatives, the risk is that the seller who, after a change in 
circumstances, needs or wants to move out, will “not be able to obtain enough net pro-
ceeds to permit him or her to buy a home in the unsubsidized market” (Diamond, supra 
note 54 at 90).  
66   See Tim Iglesias, “Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability” 
(2007) 42:2 Wake Forest L Rev 511 at 519-30; Lorna Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theo-
ries, Laws and Policies (Oxford: Hart, 2007) at 7-11, 33-37. 
67   See Iglesias, supra note 66 at 530-38. 
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 Another way to deal with the tension between the goals of common 
ownership and negative freedom is to argue that the constraints on nega-
tive freedom that are typical of affordable-housing co-operatives are justi-
fied by the members’ consent. Full disclosure is an integral part of enter-
ing these commons. Prospective buyers or members learn the “rights, re-
sponsibilities, and limitations that accompany the property” that they are 
buying.68 Buyers, one could say, are “happy slaves”:69 they are free agents 
bound only by their own choices. However, the consent argument presents 
a number of difficulties. 
 For instance, “consent theory is ... entangled in substantive con-
cerns ... about when choice is [actually] voluntary.”70 A choice without rea-
sonable alternatives is not voluntary.71 As is mentioned above, members 
of affordable-housing co-operatives have limited alternatives. Consent 
theory also presupposes that the free agent has chosen her social role. 
Members of affordable-housing co-operatives may be steeped in a specific 
“culture of poverty”72 or “culture of property”73 because of a combination of 
unchosen characteristics, including ethnicity, class, and income. These de-
terminants of their social role influence the choices that members of af-
fordable-housing co-operatives make. 
 The example of affordable-housing co-operatives shows that happy so-
lutions to difficult trade-offs are not always possible. The best that we can 
do is to provide a normatively appealing justification for such trade-offs. 
The next section of this article revisits the idea of equality of autonomy 
from the nineteenth-century European debate on common ownership. 
This notion restores the concern with economic equality to the commons 
debate and provides an appealing justification for hard trade-offs that 
disadvantage the negative freedom of individuals.  
                                                  
68   Davis, supra note 51 at 57. 
69   Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press, 1989) at ix. 
70   Ibid at 246. 
71   See ibid at 225. 
72   Kennedy, supra note 54 at 103, 110. 
73   Marc Choko & Richard Harris, “The Local Culture of Property: A Comparative History 
of Housing Tenure in Montreal and Toronto” (1990) 80:1 Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 73 at 73 (arguing that Montreal has long had a peculiar culture 
of property). “[W]e may expect the local combination of general forces [e.g., income, 
class, and ethnic composition] to give rise to autonomous and distinctively local pro-
cesses. This, we argue, was the case in Montreal, where a variety of factors combined to 
create what we describe as a ‘local culture of property’” (ibid at 75).  
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II. The Debate on Collective Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
A. Changing Attitudes Toward Collective Ownership 
 The reassessment of Demsetz’s and Hardin’s tragic accounts of com-
mon ownership and the proliferation of antitragedy views is déjà vu to 
historians of European law. In Europe, a similar shift in attitude from 
pessimism and hostility toward communal proprietary regimes to re-
newed interest in them occurred significantly earlier. For a couple of dec-
ades late in the nineteenth century, collective property was a topic of re-
search and heated debate among scholars, as well as a viable option for 
policy-makers.74  
 For centuries in most Western European countries, lands had been 
held, used, and managed in common by groups of owners. Collectively 
owned lands and collective use rights were “an essential lubricant of the 
rural economy.”75 They provided the lower strata of the rural population 
with sustenance and, at times, surplus income.76 A vital element in the 
social and economic fabric, these forms of collective landownership dif-
                                                  
74   Recently, in France and in Italy, a vast historiographical literature has rediscovered the 
nineteenth-century debates on common ownership. Earlier historiography emphasized 
the “destructive frenzy” that, since the French Revolution, has animated the legisla-
ture’s repeated attempts to wipe out existing forms of common landownership. By con-
trast, recent revisionist scholarship foregrounds the existence, in the late nineteenth 
century, of a vibrant collectivist movement (i.e., a prolific strand of scholarly literature 
and policy discussions that reassessed the merits of common-ownership regimes). Revi-
sionists argue that the debate over common ownership is important because it success-
fully disputed, and presented alternatives to, the ideological and cultural primacy of 
private property: see generally Paolo Grossi, An Alternative to Private Property: Collec-
tive Property in the Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century, translated by 
Lydia G Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Nadine Vivier, Proprié-
té collective et identité communale : Les biens communaux en France, 1750-1914 (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998). See also Marie-Danielle Demélas & Nadine Vivier, 
eds, Les propriétés collectives face aux attaques libérales (1750-1914) : Europe occiden-
tale et Amérique latine (Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2003) (for a 
study of collective property in different European countries).  
75   PM Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988) at 19, 124-54. See also Thompson, supra note 15 at 73-150. 
76   For instance, in France, according to a cadastral survey of 1846, communally owned 
lands or lands burdened with collective-use rights amounted to nine per cent of the 
French territory; fifty-nine per cent of such lands were for grazing and approximately 
thirty-five per cent were cultivated: see Vivier, supra note 74 at 33. Similarly, in Italy, a 
widely cited survey of 1947 estimates that collective lands totalled ten per cent of the 
national territory: for a detailed analysis, see Nadia Carestiato, Beni comuni e proprietà 
collettiva come attori territoriali per lo sviluppo locale [Communal Goods and Collective 
Property as Regional Actors for Local Development] (Doctoral Thesis, Università Degli 
Studi di Padova, 2008) [unpublished]. 
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fered widely but fell into three main types.77 The first type consisted of use 
rights held in common by the inhabitants of a village or town over lands 
owned either by the town as public property or by a private landowner. 
These use rights were limited entitlements to specific uses, such as graz-
ing, lumbering, and hunting.78  
 In contrast to these limited use rights, the second type of collective 
property consisted of lands owned in common by an open group, often the 
inhabitants of a village or town. The entitlement was ampler than a spe-
cific use right, each “owner” having the right to use and manage the land, 
to appropriate its fruits and profit, and to exclude non-owners. Each male 
individual who resided in the village for a certain period of time became 
an owner.79 
 The third type of communal property consisted of lands owned by a 
closed group, usually a small number of families and their descendants. 
These agrarian collectives were centuries old and numerous. They varied 
in name and organizational structure from region to region.80 Most of 
them still exist.81 
 While these forms of collective ownership had existed for centuries, it 
was only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that they became a 
matter of concern for the legislature. The development of a tragic attitude 
                                                  
77   This classification is standard in the Italian literature on collective property: see Fab-
rizio Marinelli, Gli usi civici [The Civil Use Rights] (Milan: Dott A Giuffrè, 2003); Diges-
to delle discipline privatistiche: Sezione civile [Digest of Private Law Disciplines: Civil 
Section], 4th ed (Turin: Utet, 1999), “Usi civici” [Civil Use Rights] by Alberto Germano 
at 542 ff. 
78   The origin of collective lands and use rights has, for centuries, been the object of intense 
debate. Proponents of the “immemorial common origins” theory (historians of Roman 
law and of ancient customary law—in France, the coutumes) argue that these lands are 
the original and natural property of the community of inhabitants of the village or 
town. By contrast, proponents of the “feudalist” theory (scholars of feudal law) argue 
that collective lands originated as rights of use over feudal land, which were granted in 
medieval times by a feudal lord to the local population, either as a benevolent conces-
sion or as a formal recognition of an actual use by the population dating back to remote, 
prefeudal times. With the end of feudalism, these lands became the public property of 
the village or town, and the inhabitants retained their use rights: see Vivier, supra note 
74 at 42-43; Roger Graffin, Les biens communaux en France: Étude historique et critique 
(Paris: Guillaumin, 1899) at 41 (for France). See generally Romualdo Trifone, Feudi e 
demani [Fiefdoms and Domains] (Milan: Societa Editrice Libraria, 1909) (for Italy).  
79   This second form is known as universita’ agrarie or comunanze: see Alberto Cencelli, La 
Proprietà Collettiva in Italia [Collective Property in Italy], 2d ed (Milan: Libraio Della 
Real Casa, 1920) at 25, 32. 
80   See ibid at 17-83 (for an analysis of agrarian collectives in various Italian regions). 
81   This is the case for the partecipanze of the Emilia region: see Legge 4 August 1894, n 
397, in GU 5 september 1894, n 209 (It). 
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toward collective ownership, in many respects similar to Hardin’s idea of 
a tragedy of the commons, raised the question of how to regulate collective 
ownership. In both France and Italy, the question was whether to sup-
press or to reorganize the existing collective landownership regimes. This 
question fuelled a passionate response from the parties involved (i.e., the 
landowners and the peasantry), attracting a great deal of attention among 
everyone from experts to the general public.82  
 The tragic attitude that prevailed for most of the nineteenth century 
came as no surprise. In Europe, the century following the French Revolu-
tion of 1789 was the “age of [individual] property”.83 “‘Whatever the grand 
words adorning the revolution,’ wrote Hippolyte Taine, ‘it was essentially 
a transformation of property’”84—the transformation of a feudal system, 
based on privileges and prerogatives, into a modern social and legal sys-
tem based on the individual’s absolute property rights. Before the French 
Revolution, lands were subject to multiple claims. Property rights were 
split between a subject and users. The subject, usually a feudal lord, had 
direct or eminent ownership (i.e., title), while users had utile ownership 
(i.e., use rights).85 The major achievement of the revolution was to reduce 
or to cancel feudal claims, instead awarding absolute property rights to 
the individuals who held utile ownership.86 Hence, in the post-
Revolutionary sensibility, the very idea of multiple owners came to be as-
sociated with feudalism and to be seen as backward.  
                                                  
82   See Jones, supra note 75 at 124-67 (discussing the struggle between landless peasants 
and landowners over collective lands and use rights in France at the time of the revolu-
tion). The crucial and heated phase of the debate, which involved policy-makers and law 
professors, took place in the 1880s and 1890s: see Grossi, supra note 74 at 196-231 (dis-
cussing the debate in the Italian parliament); Vivier, supra note 74 at 281-91 (discuss-
ing the “expert” debate among economists, lawyers, agronomists, and policy-makers in 
France).  
83   See Donald R Kelley & Bonnie G Smith, “What Was Property? Legal Dimensions of the 
Social Question in France (1789–1848)” (1984) 128:3 Proceedings of the American Phil-
osophical Society 200 at 201. The authors argue that the period between 1789 and 1848 
was the “age of property”: “[N]ever was the alliance [between law and property] more 
conspicuous than in [this age]. ... The lawyers were the first to define ‘bourgeois’ proper-
ty in the wake of the Revolution” and to translate it into the positive law of the civil 
code of 1804 (ibid).  
84   Kelley & Smith, supra note 83 at 203, citing H Taine, Les origines de la France contem-
poraine (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1878) at 386 [translated by Kelley & Smith]. 
See also John Henry Merryman, “Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by 
Lawson)” (1974) 48:4 Tul L Rev 916 at 923. 
85   See Kelley & Smith, supra note 83 at 203-204. See Cornelia Munteanu, “Historical Re-
marks on the Legal Notion of Property” [2005] (supplement) Acta Universiatis Lucian 
Blaga 54 at 62 (on the doctrine of split ownership or double domain).  
86   See Kelley & Smith, supra note 83 at 203. 
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 By contrast, individual ownership was seen as conducive to progress 
and happiness. As the French jurist Germain Garnier put it, “[T]he more 
earth is covered with societies of property owners, the greater the chance 
for happiness for the whole species.”87 A tragic view of collective owner-
ship dominated among lawyers and economists. One proponent of what 
we could call an early law and economics approach88 asked, “What love or 
labour can one invest in these [collective] lands knowing that no personal 
benefit can result and that the only possible return would come from 
overusing them at the expense of others?”89  
 The general ideological commitment to individual property and the 
tragic tale of collective ownership were mirrored in legislation. Collective 
property was virtually absent from the civil codes of the “age of property”. 
In the Code civil des Français (1804), collective ownership was relegated 
to absolute marginality: article 542 barely mentioned it.90 The Italian Co-
dice civile of 1865 made no mention of collective ownership at all.91 In ad-
dition, the legislature in both France and Italy attempted to wipe out the 
existing forms of collective land tenure in what historians describe as a 
“destructive frenzy”.92 In France, the most important act of destructive 
frenzy was the law of June 10, 1793, which encouraged the enclosure of 
the commons.93 In 1888, after a “tortuous legislative itinerary” where ad-
                                                  
87   Ibid at 204, citing M Germain Garnier, De la propriété dans ses rapports avec le droit 
politique (Paris: G Clavelin, 1792) at 84 [translated by Kelley & Smith].  
88   Pio Barsanti, describing his methodological commitments, refers to “us, humble devo-
tees of Law and Economics” (“noi, modesti cultori del Diritto e dell’ Economia”): see La 
Socialità nel Sistema Della Proprietà Privata [Sociality in Systems of Property] (Lucca, 
Italy: Tipografia Giusti, 1880) at 43 [translated by author].  
89   Ibid (“[c]he amore, che cura volete voi che porti il privato a queste terre, quando egli sa 
che a lui non viene da ciò nessun vantaggio, e questo gli viene tutto dall’ usufruire più 
largamente che può della proprietà collettiva?” at 37).  
90   Art 542 CcF (“Les biens communaux sont ceux à la propriété ou au produit desquels les 
habitants d'une ou plusieurs communes ont un droit acquis” [Common property is that 
to whose ownership or revenue the inhabitants or one or several communes have a 
vested right]). 
91   This omission reflects the liberal ideology of the Risorgimento, the movement of political 
and ethical “resurgence” that led to Italy’s unification in 1861. Individual autonomy 
(i.e., freedom from any prerogative attached to status or tradition and protection from 
state interference) was seen as the central pillar of the political and economic order of 
the new country. On the Risorgimento, see generally Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgi-
mento: State, Society and National Unification (London, UK: Routledge, 1994). 
92   Germano, supra note 77 (“smania distruggitrice” at 535). See also Grossi, supra note 74 
(describing the destructive frenzy as “a monolithic attitude that without the slightest 
sign of sympathy had uprooted and destroyed these constructions [i.e., collective do-
mains] in the name of the superior model of individual property” at 201).  
93   The law allowed for the commons to be divided with the favourable vote of at least one-
third of the inhabitants. While absentee landlords and former feudal lords were exclud-
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vocates of collective ownership fought vigorously, a law abolishing collec-
tive use rights in many provinces of central Italy was passed.94  
 However, by the late 1880s, the attitude toward collective ownership 
changed. The agrarian crisis that struck most of Europe in the 1880s and 
1890s raised questions regarding the unequal distribution of land and 
made the need for agrarian reform urgent.95 Also, in both France and Ita-
      
ed from the ballot, every adult, male or female, had the right to vote. Once approved, 
partition was organized on a per capita basis, irrespective of age or sex, on the condition 
that the village had settled outstanding debts. Beneficiaries enjoyed full property rights 
over their parcels, but they could not sell them or transfer them in payment of debts for 
ten years: see generally Noelle L Plack, “Agrarian Individualism, Collective Practices 
and the French Revolution: The Law of 10 June 1793 and the Partition of Common 
Land in the Department of the Gard” (2005) 35:1 European History Quarterly 39 at 41-
42. 
94  Grossi, supra note 74 at 201. Grossi notes that the efforts of the supporters of collective 
ownership were not vain: “For the first time a crack appeared” (ibid) in the destructive 
frenzy that had animated the legislator. As noted by Grossi, article 9 of the law provid-
ed that “in the presence of certain circumstances the Arbitration Commission could al-
low the entire parcel in question to be left to the users, in the case of the abolition of an 
encumbrance, in exchange for a yearly payment to the proprietor” (ibid). 
95   In France, the agrarian depression of the Second Republic (1848–52) and the phylloxera 
epidemic of the 1870s and 1880s triggered a cycle marked by overproduction, falling 
prices, strikes, and mass demonstrations. Socialism began to spread. Soon after the 
revolution, socialists had recruited peasants, many of who had not been radicals in the 
Revolutionary period, into local organizations that sponsored co-operatives. For in-
stance, in Provence, small-scale owners embraced the party’s program of total collectivi-
zation of the land. Collectivist doctrines mirrored and reinforced the peasants’ own pre-
existing practice of economic co-operation, especially in the wine industry: see generally 
Noelle Plack, Common Land, Wine and the French Revolution: Rural Society and Econ-
omy in Southern France, c. 1789–1820 (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009) at 85. On the rise 
of socialism among the peasantry, see generally Tony Judt, Socialism in Provence, 
1871-1914: A Study in the Origins of the Modern French Left (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979). Italy was also experiencing a dramatic agrarian crisis 
that badly affected the Mezzogiorno (the southern part of country), where the land was 
in the hands of few: the latifundia—large estates, usually under absentee ownership—
were the dominant form of land tenure. Land was operated, with minimal investments 
in improvement and technology, by precarious sharecroppers and share tenants under 
short-term contracts with the owner. Inimical to agricultural production and explosive 
for social relations, this situation resulted in endemic violence and periodic insurrec-
tions. Anarchism flourished among the peasants. Bakunin’s short stay in Naples in the 
1860s contributed to the rapid spread of his notion of spontaneous and continual revo-
lution among southern peasants. The peasant uprisings of the 1870s and 1880s were 
repressed by the Italian army and guard units of local landowners. However, the legit-
imacy of the newly formed national state was questioned: remote and powerless, the 
state started to be identified by many with the usurpations of the bourgeoisie. An effec-
tive policy response was needed: see Sidney G Tarrow, Peasant Communism in South-
ern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Frank M Snowden, Violence and 
the Great Estates in the South of Italy: Apulia, 1900–1922 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
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ly, the conjuncture of economic crisis, social change, and collectivist prop-
aganda brought into existence a rural socialist or anarchist political cul-
ture.96 This development generated alarm among moderates and con-
servatives.  
 Faced with these challenges, a broad coalition of moderate and pro-
gressive policy-makers began to reassess collective ownership. Restoring 
the commons had long been a priority in the agenda of the socialist left. 
When, at the beginning of the 1890s, Jules Guesde’s Parti Ouvrier 
launched a new strategy of alliance with the rural masses, the goal of im-
proving and expanding the commons was among the party’s priorities.97 
Similarly, in Italy, expropriating lands left idle and assigning them to co-
operatives was an important item in the minimum program approved at 
the 1895 congress of the Socialist Party.98  
 The socialists’ commitment to collective ownership was long standing. 
The moderates’ interest in common ownership, however, was a product of 
the new European intellectual climate. To the moderates, collective own-
ership did not smack of socialism, because it had been rehabilitated by the 
work of European historians and legal scholars.99 Henry Maine’s Ancient 
Law argued that the institution of private property was not known in the 
ancient law and that land was owned by extended families and groups ra-
ther than by individuals.100 Maine’s work, extremely influential, sparked 
debate in intellectual circles in Italy and France. Émile de Laveleye’s De 
la propriété et de ses formes primitives (1874) further developed and 
                                                  
96   See generally Judt, supra note 95 (discussing France); TR Ravindranathan Bakunin 
and the Italians (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988) (discussing Italy).  
97   See Vivier, supra note 74 at 285-86.  
98   “ Il programma minimo del 1895 : Riforme politiche economiche amministrative” [The 
Minimum Program of 1895: Administrative Reform of Economic Policy] in Antologia so-
cialista [Socialist Anthology, 1857-1982], ed by Luca Guglielminetti (Socialisti.net) 16-
17, online : Issuu <http://issuu.com/ncletterario/docs/antologia_socialista>.  
99   Historians debated the historical origins and forms of property: see Grossi, supra note 
74 at 8-19. Participants in the debate were jurists and historians of law who were anti-
formalists; that is, they were eager to challenge the dominant legal academic culture 
that “worked and operated ... under and in the shelter of the postulate of individual 
property, which it saw as the Pillars of Hercules of its consideration of legal problems 
and as the limit beyond which such consideration would have been illegitimate” (ibid at 
5). They also had a “taste for the positive, which had been expressed philosophically al-
ternately in historicist and naturalistic terms, found concrete expression for the jurist 
and the sociologist in an incessant curiosity, a curiosity which, far from being dilettante, 
tended toward a purified scientific observation of the totality of surrounding phenome-
na” (ibid at 12). Animated by this taste for the positive, participants in the debate en-
gaged in erudite, ground-breaking investigations and data collection: see ibid at 12, 15.  
100  See ibid at 27-52, citing Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early 
History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (London, UK: John Murray, 1861). 
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spread the idea that collective ownership had been the established mode 
of ownership for most of Western history.101  
 The new cultural openness toward collective ownership was not lim-
ited to scholars. French painter Émile van Marcke, of the famous École de 
Barbizon, presented a canvas titled Common Grazing Field in Normandy 
at the Paris Salon of 1875.102 It portrayed a stout, healthy cow on a lush, 
green common field, thereby visually portraying the newly rediscovered 
idea that the commons could be prosperous and productive. 
B. The Italian Bill on the Reorganization of Land Collectives and the Com-
mitment to Equality of Autonomy 
 In Italy, collective property, rehabilitated in the eyes of the intellectu-
al and political elite, became an important item in the legislative agenda. 
For Italian lawyers, the 1890s were a moment of great political and intel-
lectual energy. Property law seemed like a viable tool for experimental so-
cial change.103 Lawyers and policy-makers of different political orienta-
tions vigorously backed legislative proposals for the reorganization of the 
existing land collectives. In March 1892, a large group of moderate-
centrist MPs led by Tommaso Tittoni presented a bill on the reorganiza-
tion of the collective domains in the former Papal States, and the bill was 
eventually approved in 1894 with the support of the Socialist Party.104 The 
Tittoni bill was a hands-off, enabling piece of legislation rather than an 
ambitious exercise in institutional design. Its effect was simply to grant 
legal personality to the collectives and to accord them the power to draw 
up their regulatory statutes within a year.105 What was unique about the 
Tittoni bill, however, was the normative discourse that led to its approval. 
In the parliamentary debate, conservatives and socialists both agreed that 
                                                  
101  See ibid at 53-70, citing Émile de Laveleye, De la propriété et de ses formes primitives 
(Paris: Librarie Germer Ballière, 1874). 
102 See Vivier, supra note 74 at 298. 
103  Grossi emphasizes the creativity of the collectivist jurists and their pragmatic attitude 
toward social change: 
  There was a singular, a notable quality in our debate [on collective ownership]. 
It did not remain an academic affair among university professors, confined to the 
dazzling prose of an inaugural lecture or of an innovative scientific essay. Rather, it 
tended in one way or another to be translated into an operative reality. As we will 
see in part two, this was one of the rare instances in which a mainly doctrinal mat-
ter has the freedom of the city in the chambers of Parliament, in which it acts as a 
stimulant to legislators and leaves its mark on several official reports and even on 
several acts of legislation (supra note 74 at 7). 
104  See ibid at 218-31. 
105  See ibid at 218. 
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collective landownership could make the autonomy that derives from 
landownership available on a more widespread basis.  
 The general sense among supporters of the bill was that the late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century enclosures and the transfer of 
small parcels in full ownership to peasants had failed. The parcels were 
often too small to support a family. The new owners were released into an 
agricultural economy plagued by lack of capital, limited access to credit, 
and inadequate productive technologies. As a result, they lost their land 
in short time to a rising middle class that was eager to invest in land. 
Supporters of the bill believed that collective ownership, with its mecha-
nisms for co-operation and coordination, would be more effective in pro-
moting peasants’ self-sufficiency and self-empowerment.  
 The notion of equality of autonomy was new to the normative dis-
course of European property lawyers. On the left, the idea of equality of 
autonomy was both novel and controversial. The very word “autonomy” 
smacked of bourgeois individualism,106 but Deputy Matteo Imbriani of the 
Radical Party powerfully articulated the new idea in the parliamentary 
debates relating to the Tittoni bill. He advanced autonomy and social jus-
tice, the two great ideals that move radicals. Imbriani appealled to the 
revolutionary aspirations of the socialists and challenged those who dis-
missed autonomy as a bourgeois ideal. He started his discussion of auton-
omy by reminding fellow deputies that autonomy is associated with a fun-
damental sense of human dignity and is the motor of social change.107 
“Under feudalism,” he asked, “wasn’t it this autonomy that moved the 
minds, that told the maid, dragged to the lord’s bed, rise, take out the 
weapon you are hiding in your braids and act?”108 In contemporary par-
lance, Imbriani’s notion of autonomy is “effective agency,” that is, the ac-
tual material means to pursue one’s life plans. “Our theory,” he declared, 
“holds that all who are worthy of this name [human] because of their 
work, their genius and their virtue, should own a parcel of land that en-
                                                  
106  See Proprietà Collettiva e Lotta di Classe: Discorso del Deputato Enrico Ferri e Polemica 
col Deputato M. R. Imbriani [Collective Property and Class Struggle: Deputy Enrico 
Ferri’s Speech and Debate with Deputy M. R. Imbriani] (Rome: Tipografia Della Cam-
era Dei Deputati, 1894) at 40. Ferri accused Imbriani of having betrayed the radical left 
by embracing individualism and by defending the bourgeoisie:  
  The Honourable Imbriani, speaking from the bench of the extreme left against a 
deputy of the same political sector, advocated ideas that sparked vivid enthusiasm 
in the other [conservative] side of the Chamber, thereby showing and confirming my 
statement that there are two currents: the individualist, of which the Honourable 
Imbriani is a representative, and the socialist (ibid [translated by author]).  
107  See ibid at 37 (contains a reproduction of Imbriani’s speech, where he describes auton-
omy as “human dignity, human sentiments, human rights” [translated by author]). 
108  Ibid [translated by author]. 
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sures their independence and ability to affirm themselves in the struggle 
of life ... for the benefit of all.”109 
 Imbriani convinced the socialists of the importance of equality of au-
tonomy by defining autonomy as the availability of resources that enable 
individuals to carry out their projects. When the members of the Socialist 
Party signed the Tittoni bill, they signalled that they had abandoned their 
initial discomfort with the individualistic flavour of calls for greater equal-
ity of autonomy. Then, the socialists pushed the idea of equality of auton-
omy further. For Socialist Party MP Enrico Ferri, equality of autonomy 
required more than giving legal personality and self-regulatory power to 
existing collectives. It required making effective agency available to all, 
regardless of gender or age.  
 Ferri argued that collectives would have to expand membership and 
management to make the resources that enable individuals to be autono-
mous available on a more widespread basis. In most collectives, access 
was closed: it was limited to the descendants of the original members or 
conditioned upon certain property requirements, such as ownership of a 
specified number of head of cattle. Membership was also limited to male 
residents in most cases. Female-headed peasant households represented a 
large and particularly disadvantaged segment of the rural poor, but they 
could not be owners under the Tittoni bill. Accordingly, the Socialist Party 
proposed two egalitarian amendments to the Tittoni bill. The first 
amendment opened up membership to all residents, male and female, be-
tween the ages of eighteen and sixty. The second allowed women to vote 
in elections of officers to the governing bodies.110 Neither amendment 
made it into the final legislative text. 
 While the left had to work through its skepticism about autonomy, 
conservatives had to work through their unease about calls for equality. 
Count Alberto Cencelli Perti noted in his 1892 book, Collective Property in 
Italy, that conservatives had long been committed to political equality but 
considered social and economic inequality natural and necessary.111 The 
agrarian crisis and the peasant uprisings made conservatives realize that 
“since we proclaimed the principle of political equality, we should have 
expected that, sooner or later, the people would demand equality of mate-
rial conditions.”112 Cencelli and other moderate conservatives came to see 
greater economic equality as crucial to the stability of the existing social 
order. Inequality, Cencelli noted, quoting Aristotle, is the source of all 
                                                  
109  Ibid at 46 [translated by author]. 
110  See ibid at 28-30. 
111  Cencelli, supra note 79 at 89. 
112  Ibid [translated by author]. 
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revolutions.113 In his book, Cencelli proposed to reorganize existing collec-
tives along egalitarian lines.114 Rules regulating entry, that is, access to 
the collective lands, were the backbone of Cencelli’s proposal. Cencelli dif-
ferentiated between grazing lands and agricultural lands. While access to 
the former would be open to all, agricultural lands would be divided in 
lots and assigned to individual residents or households, on the basis of 
need, for a term of twenty years or so.115 For Cencelli, the foremost ad-
vantage of his proposal was that it would provide the possibility of auton-
omy to the rural proletariat. It would give the formerly landless assignee 
access to a parcel of land of which she could consider herself owner, about 
which she could make informed management and production decisions, 
and on which she couldwork more profitably than as a salaried worker.116 
 Conservatives and socialists advocated greater equality of autonomy 
for opposing reasons. The former deemed it necessary to stifle peasant 
unrest and to preserve the existing social and economic order.117 The lat-
ter saw it as the closest they could get to an ideal society where a system 
of free land would be re-established and “[a] voluntary system of co-
operation [would] ... establish itself spontaneously.”118 At the same time, 
there were some fundamental points on which the parties could agree. 
These points made the debate surrounding the Tittoni bill unique in sev-
eral respects.  
 First, it had the effect of reorienting, for a brief moment, the conversa-
tion on property law toward the new goal of expanding access to the au-
tonomy afforded by property rights. This new goal temporarily displaced 
the old goal of maximizing the autonomy of the better off, who already 
owned land. Since the Enlightenment, philosophers and legal theorists 
have argued that property fosters individual autonomy. The general ar-
gument is that a system where individuals are granted the full package of 
property entitlements, comprising the right to exclude, to use, and to 
transfer, and where they are free to bargain in the market without inter-
                                                  
113  See ibid at 88. 
114  See ibid at 94-101. 
115  See ibid at 97-99. 
116  See ibid at 100. 
117  See ibid at 100 (“the moral effects [of his proposed scheme of collective landownership] 
are significant. The proletarian, who occasionally may become violent and even worse, 
is turned into a conservative citizen; [collective property is] a safety valve against the 
spread of subversive ideas” at 100 [translated by author]). 
118  Achille Loria, The Economic Foundations of Society, translated by Lindley M Keasbey 
(London, UK: Swan Sonnenschein, 1910) at 7.  
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ference, makes individuals autonomous.119 It frees them from the re-
straints that prevent them from acting on their actual desires. This au-
tonomy involves many abilities: freedom of action, privacy, and self-
expression. As Adam Smith saw, in Jedidiah Purdy’s reading of Smith, 
property rights and markets afford individuals the ability to pursue their 
projects and to bargain over the terms of their co-operation.120 Further, 
property provides, both literally and figuratively, the “necessary walls” 
that allow individuals to retreat into their sphere of privacy.121 Finally, in 
the Hegelian tradition, ownership allows individuals to constitute them-
selves as people by extending their will over the objects of the external 
world.122 Ferri, Cencelli, and the other participants in the 1894 debate 
took this belief in the autonomy benefits of property further. They argued 
that common ownership could allow a larger number of individuals to 
benefit from this autonomy.123 
 Second, participants in the debate shared the pragmatic belief that 
property law could be changed and improved to advance new goals. Earli-
er calls for equality had often rejected the very institution of property as 
unjust. Marx and Proudhon obviously come to mind. But Ferri, Cencelli, 
and Imbriani believed in property. They believed in the possibility of re-
shaping a system of property rules that, for centuries, had been centred 
on private property. They defied the conventional view of private property 
                                                  
119  For contemporary articulations of this argument see Richard A Epstein, “Property and 
Necessity” (1990) 13:2 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 2. Epstein argues that “[i]f possession, use, 
and disposition turn out to be the ideal bundle of property rights, ... [so that] voluntary 
transactions take place between people who are in a position to sell and people who are 
in a position to buy, ... [t]his system would necessarily have a self-generating capacity 
with each successive ... transfer” and would produce “more by way of gains than it 
would produce by way of losses, ... [and] we would move to higher and higher levels of 
social satisfaction ... [and] private gratification” (ibid at 4). See also generally Richard 
Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Vintage Books, 1999); Milton Friedman with 
the assistance of Rose D Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002) at 7-21.  
120  See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
1976); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed by RL Meek, DD Raphael & PG 
Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). On Smith’s theory of property, the market, and 
freedom, see Purdy, supra note 34 at 1251-58. 
121  On property as privacy see Eduardo M Peñalver, “Property as Entrance” (2005) 91:8 Va 
L Rev 1889. 
122  See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by TM Knox (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1942) 
at 40-41. Among US property scholars, the Hegelian perspective is most importantly 
associated with the work of Margaret Radin: see Margaret Jane Radin, “Property and 
Personhood” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957. 
123  For a contemporary argument about property, equality, and freedom, see D Benjamin 
Barros, “Property and Freedom” (2009) 4:1 New York University Journal of Law & Lib-
erty 36. 
                                 COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EQUALITY OF AUTONOMY  293 
 
 
as natural and unshakable. What they had in mind was a hybrid system 
in which private property and common property would complement each 
other.  
III. The New Commons and Equality of Autonomy 
 This section turns to contemporary American property law and shows 
how the idea of equality of autonomy recuperated from the nineteenth-
century European debate on collective ownership is key for expanding and 
redirecting the commons debate.  
A. Equality of Autonomy 
 In nineteenth-century Europe, the parliamentary debate on the Titto-
ni bill that reorganized agrarian collectives set the stage for a new under-
standing of how property fosters individual autonomy. Today, we need a 
similar normative reorientation. Our conversation about the potential of 
common ownership should be expanded to include a similar notion of 
equality of autonomy. This notion of equality of autonomy should build 
upon insights from the European late nineteenth-century debate on com-
mon ownership, as well as recent debates in political philosophy. It should 
support equitable access to the means of obtaining autonomy, defined as 
the relative absence of restraints and the presence of resources enabling 
individuals to carry out their critically appraised projects and preferences.  
 The notion of equality of autonomy that I propose focuses on the 
means for autonomy rather than on the condition of autonomy. Propo-
nents of egalitarian liberalism are faced with the question “Equality of 
what?”124 Some have argued for equality of condition. The argument is 
                                                  
124  Egalitarians have long discussed the “equalisandum” (i.e., what it is that should be 
equalized): see Richard J Arneson, “‘Equality of What?’ Revisited” (for APSA), (5 August 
2010), online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653981>; 
John E Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1996) (on the debate in general). Participants in the “Equality of what?” debate 
have expressed a variety of views. John Rawls characterizes the need for equality in 
terms of “primary social goods”. These consist of everything that every rational man is 
presumed to want, including rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and 
the social bases of self-respect: see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). Amartya Sen shifts the focus from 
goods to what goods do for human beings. He proposes equality of basic capabilities. 
Justice requires that all members of society have basic capabilities to do and be what 
they have reason to value at a decent threshold level: see Amartya Sen, Inequality 
Reexamined (New York, Cambridge, Mass: Russell Sage Foundation, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1992). Ronald Dworkin argues for equality of resources: Sovereign Virtue: 
The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2000). Dworkin’s is “a starting-gate theory identifying distributive justice with an equal 
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that one of the fundamental requirements of justice is that social and po-
litical institutions be arranged so as to allow people’s conditions to be as 
equal as possible. Individuals should be made equal in subjective happi-
ness, understood either in terms of hedonic states or preference satisfac-
tion or the good life.125 However, as many have noted, equality of condition 
fails as an expression of egalitarian concerns for two reasons.126 First, it 
leaves little room for individual responsibility. For example, it requires 
that we compensate people for having expensive tastes. It fails to 
acknowledge that individuals should take responsibility for their overall 
life ambitions and discrete preferences, as well as the social costs of these 
choices. Furthermore, it minimizes the reward for individual effort. Sec-
ond, critics have noted that equality of condition “[f]ails to recognize ‘ex-
pensive needs’: [that is, that] some people may simply not be able to be 
made ‘equal’ in any space/metric of ‘outcome’,” for example, people who 
are severely disabled or who have expensive medical requirements.127  
 The concept of autonomy that I embrace is multi-dimensional. It in-
cludes negative freedom, positive freedom, and relational self-
determination. In their debates, Ferri, Imbriani, and Cencelli envisioned 
a positive or substantive autonomy. They realized that equal access to the 
possibility of autonomy requires equal access to land. They also realized 
that positive action is needed to redress the inequalities that result from 
private property in a market economy. The positive action that they had 
in mind was legislation that would reinvigorate a long neglected private-
law tool—collective ownership. They had witnessed the failure, in the long 
term, of land enclosures as a means for achieving a more equal distribu-
tion of land. Hence, they came to see the potential of collective ownership. 
Today, common ownership remains an important tool for expanding ac-
cess to resources that enable individual autonomy and human flourishing. 
It can do so better than individual ownership. 
      
initial allocation of material resources adjusted by an insurance scheme to compensate 
individuals for brute luck handicaps and low marketable talent, and after that with 
whatever results from people’s choices in a fair framework for interaction including op-
portunities to insure against future brute luck misfortunes” (Arneson, supra note 124 at 
1). G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should care about equality of access to ad-
vantage. The nature of advantage includes both resources and welfare: On the Currency 
of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, ed by Michael Otsuka 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).  
125  In particular, see Syed, “Equality of What?”, supra note 20; Arneson, supra note 124 at 
1-2. 
126  See Syed, “Equality of What?”, supra note 20. 
127  Ibid. See also Talha Syed, “Equality, Priority & Justice in Differential Needs: The Prin-
ciple of Proportionate Benefit/Sacrifice” [forthcoming in 2013]. 
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 Take housing as an example. Distressed and underfunded, the public 
housing system often fails to deliver decent homes, a safe environment, 
and neighbourhood quality.128 Also, for many, public or subsidized housing 
is not an option: their income is too high to qualify for most forms of sub-
sidized housing but too low to allow them to enter the private market for 
housing.129 By limiting equity and promoting self-government, forms of 
common ownership such as limited equity co-operatives are effective in 
securing long-term, good-quality, affordable housing. They are not a sub-
stitute for traditional public housing but rather a crucial complement to 
it. Another form of common ownership, co-housing arrangements, can 
have important advantages over individual home ownership. These ar-
rangements allow co-owners to share the cost of the mortgage or rent, as 
well as the cost of utilities, maintenance, and insurance.130 Further, 
through co-housing, co-owners can “share the cost of amenities that [they] 
couldn't afford on [their] ... own, such as a hot tub ... or large yard.” Both 
housing co-operatives and co-housing also make it easier to access other 
resources. For instance, they allow co-owners to share the cost of basic 
services such as child care or in-home care.131 
 Take, as a further example of common ownership, land or water. 
Standard regulatory mechanisms of land use, such as zoning, have lim-
ited effectiveness in preserving land-use diversity, open space, and ecolog-
ically sensitive lands in sufficiently large quantities. Mechanisms of pri-
vate land use and open-space planning based on common ownership, such 
as land conservation trusts or water trusts, may be an important com-
plement to standard land-use regulation.132  
 Common ownership can also expand access to leisure goods that are 
often too expensive to be owned individually. For example, fractional 
                                                  
128  I do not imply that public housing can never be a success story; incredible energy has 
been invested in redeveloping public housing, and experiments such as the Horner pro-
ject in Chicago have been successful: see e.g. William P Wilen, “The Horner Model: Suc-
cessfully Redeveloping Public Housing”, online: (2006) 1:1 Northwestern Journal of Law 
& Social Policy 62; Terry AC Gray, “De-concentrating Poverty and Promoting Mixed-
Income Communities in Public Housing: The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility 
Act of 1998” (1999) 11:1 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 173. 
129  See Davis, supra note 51 at 94. 
130  See Janelle Orsi & Emily Doskow, The Sharing Solution: How to Save Money, Simplify 
Your Life & Build Community (Berkeley: Nolo, 2009) 137-88; Mark Fenster, “Commu-
nity by Covenant, Process and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common In-
terest Community” (1999-2000) 15:1 J Land Use & Envtl L 3. 
131  Orsi & Doskow, supra note 130 at 137. 
132  On water trusts, see Mary Ann King, “Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water 
Trusts” (2004) 28:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 495. 
296   (2012) 58:2  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
ownership arrangements can bring the luxury of a vacation home or a 
sailing boat within the reach of many.133 
 Common ownership not only has the potential to equalize the means 
for positive autonomy but can also foster an autonomy that is thicker be-
cause it is relational. Relational autonomy is an idea that was largely for-
eign to the world of European late nineteenth-century policy-makers but 
that has gained prominence in contemporary debates. In recent years, 
some political philosophers arguing within liberalism have rejected the 
traditional hyperindividualism of liberal autonomy.134 They argue that 
traditional, liberal autonomy assumes that authentic choice happens in 
an “‘inner citadel’ of detached, higher-order reflection” and ignores the 
importance of other persons as sources of dialogue and meaning.135 These 
philosophers have responded by broadening the notion of autonomy to in-
clude its social or relational preconditions. They suggest that authentic 
choice can only occur in social conditions that foster certain types of hu-
man relationships.136 Authentic autonomy requires critical reflection on 
one’s own choices, which is more likely to happen in a social and discur-
sive context.137 Some individuals require the context of answering for their 
actions. Others require self-respect and self-trust, which emerge within 
relations of mutual recognition.138  
 Common-ownership schemes can provide this web of relations. Part of 
their attractiveness, for those who choose them, is co-owner immersion in 
a self-governance structure that facilitates human relations conducive to 
authentic choice. For example, there is vast support in the literature for 
the proposition that members of affordable-housing co-operatives value 
involvement in the community and in management of the co-operative for 
the sense of self-control it brings those members.139 Notwithstanding this, 
                                                  
133  See Orsi & Doskow, supra note 130 at 167.  
134  See e.g. Christman, Politics of Persons, supra note 22 at 164-86; Paul Benson, “Free 
Agency and Self-Worth” (1994) 91:12 Journal of Philosophy 650; Jennifer Nedelsky, 
“Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1:1 Yale JL & 
Feminism 7; Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 
2006); Anderson & Honneth, supra note 21 at 130-37. 
135  Christman & Anderson, “Introduction”, supra note 20 at 12. 
136  See e.g. Nedelsky, supra note 134. 
137  See Benson, supra note 134; Nedlesky, supra note 134. 
138  See Anderson & Honneth, supra note 21 at 132-35. 
139  See e.g. Kennedy, supra note 54 at 92; Susan Saegert & Lymari Benitez, “Limited Equi-
ty Housing Cooperative: A Review of the Literature” (np: City University of New York 
Graduate Center for the Taconic Foundation, 2003) at 8-10, online: Housing for All 
<http://housingforall.org/Coop_paper_FV.pdf>. 
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common ownership may not be for everyone, and the particular relations 
of interdependence it involves may not be necessary for authentic choice.  
B. Equality of Autonomy and the Trade-Offs of Common Ownership 
 Designing a common-ownership regime that has the potential to foster 
greater equality of autonomy involves difficult trade-offs. The notion of 
equality of autonomy that I propose is grounded in value pluralism. It 
suggests that common-ownership regimes should promote greater equali-
ty in multiple, equally fundamental dimensions of autonomy, namely 
negative freedom, equality of access to basic material resources, relational 
self-determination, and responsibility. These dimensions of autonomy are 
incommensurable and sometimes conflict with each other. In order to in-
crease equality in one dimension of autonomy, it may be necessary to curb 
another dimension of autonomy. Typically, increasing equality in the posi-
tive or relational dimensions of autonomy requires limiting the negative 
freedom of current co-owners. How do we choose between conflicting di-
mensions of autonomy? 
 In Part I, I discussed two ways that scholars have dealt with these 
tensions. One is to argue that co-owners have consented to these trade-
offs. The other is Dagan and Heller’s “liberal commons” balancing. Both of 
these responses, I suggested, are unsatisfying. The former raises difficult 
questions about the economic and social constraints on consent. The latter 
fails to discuss the hard cases where trade-offs simply cannot be avoided. 
In this section, I suggest another way to deal with the trade-offs of com-
mon ownership. I argue that when we ground the commitment to equality 
of autonomy in the context of specific resources, the trade-offs of common 
ownership appear less intractable. The peculiar characteristics of differ-
ent resources, and the interests that they involve, guide and constrain 
normative reasoning. Often, it will be possible to balance different dimen-
sions of autonomy. When balancing is not possible, arguments about the 
nature and the significance of the specific resource for thick autonomy 
justify equalizing positive freedom or relational autonomy, rather than 
maximizing negative freedom.140 
                                                  
140  A resource-specific approach is not new to property law. American courts have long en-
gaged in resource-specific reasoning, for example, when deciding cases involving water, 
oil, and gas: see e.g. Eric T Freyfogle, “Context and Accommodation in Modern Property 
Law” (1989) 41 Stan L Rev 1529 [Freyfogle, “Context and Accomodation”]; Craig An-
thony (Tony) Arnold, “The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests” 
(2002) 26:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 281. And property scholars have also repeatedly theorized 
a resource-specific approach. From the 1920s to the1950s, a group of French and Italian 
law professors proposed a full-fledged resource-specific theory of property, which they 
described, visually, as a tree. The trunk of the property tree is the owner’s right to ex-
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 Designing a common-ownership regime that promotes and accommo-
dates different dimensions of autonomy is a resource-specific design pro-
cess that involves several steps.  
 First, it requires Aristotelian practical reasoning. Gregory Alexander 
has described this practical reasoning as “fitting and refitting until a 
sense of complementarity” between the different dimensions of autonomy 
      
clusively control the use of a resource, mindful of property’s social function. For the the-
orists of the tree model, “social function” evokes a plurality of goals: egalitarian distri-
bution of resources and communitarian management of resources, as well as productive 
efficiency. The branches of the property tree are the multiple resource-specific property 
regimes present in modern legal systems: family property, agricultural property, af-
fordable-housing property, industrial property, etc. Each of these branches requires a 
different balance between the plural values evoked by the social function of property. 
And for each of these branches, this balance of values translates into specific rules lim-
iting and structuring owners’ control rights: see Anna di Robilant, “Property: A Bundle 
of Sticks or a Tree?” 66 Vand L Rev [forthcoming in April 2013]. The resource-specific 
design that I propose also builds on an emerging contextualism in American property 
law. Eric Freyfogle’s work on natural resources shows that property law has long been 
understood as a matter of context, relativity, and accommodation: Freyfogle, “Context 
and Accommodation”, supra note 140; Eric T Freyfogle, “Water Justice” [1986] 2 U Ill L 
Rev 481. Thirty years ago, Margaret Radin was the first to recast certain aspects of ex-
isting property doctrine in light of the relationship between types of property and per-
sonhood: supra note 122. And recent developments in property theory suggest that a 
pluralistic and contextualist approach, similar to the one proposed by the Europeans in 
the 1920s–1950s, is gaining new prominence. In his recent book, Hanoch Dagan concep-
tualizes property as a set of “property institutions” that bear a family resemblance but 
that take on different forms in different social settings: Property: Values and Institu-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Hanoch Dagan, “Reimagining 
Takings Law” in Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo M Peñalver, eds, Property and Com-
munity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 39:  
Rather than a uniform bulwark of exclusion or a formless bundle of rights, I 
believe that property should be construed as it actually is in law and in life: a 
set of institutions, each constituted by a particular configuration of rights. 
More precisely: the meaning of property, the content of an owner’s entitle-
ments, varies according to the categories of social settings in which it is situ-
ated, and according to the categories of resources subject to property rights. 
... 
... 
... Because society regards different resources (such as land, chattels, copy-
right, and patents) as variously constitutive of their possessors’ identity, the 
law treats them differently and subjects them to different property configura-
tions.  
Correspondingly, the appropriate level of constitutional protection ensured 
to property should also depend on this dimension (ibid at 48-49 [footnote 
omitted]).  
  The specific variant of this approach to property analysis that I advance in this article 
builds on Talha Syed, “An Analytics of the Commons: Resources-Values-Entitlements” 
[forthcoming in 2013]. 
                                 COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EQUALITY OF AUTONOMY  299 
 
 
“is achieved”.141 This fitting and refitting is contestable, but not arbitrary, 
because it is tailored to the specific resource: it requires discussing the 
characteristics of the specific resource. For example, resources differ in 
whether they are natural or human made, in how scarce they are, in their 
degree of rivalrousness and excludability, and in whether they are renew-
able or non-renewable, fragile or durable, and discrete or interconnected 
in essential ways to natural or human ecosystems.  
 Further, resources differ in the values and interests they implicate. 
Housing, commercial real estate, urban green space, and water all differ 
in how relevant they are to the different dimensions of autonomy. We will 
need to produce different accounts of the purpose and meaning of the re-
source. To choose between competing accounts, we may look at which one 
makes better sense of the resource’s historical meaning or its current so-
cial meaning, as reflected in the existing legal materials and in the rules 
regulating it. But ultimately, we are carried onto “contested moral ter-
rain, where we can’t remain neutral toward competing conceptions of the 
good life.”142  
 Arguments about the relevance of a resource for real autonomy help to 
justify arguments about the just distribution of the resource. Legal engi-
neers can draw on a strand of contemporary social and normative theory 
that offers a goods- or institution-specific answer to questions of distribu-
tive justice. Michael Walzer argues that every social good or set of goods 
constitutes a distributive sphere within which only certain distributive 
arrangements are appropriate. It is the shared meaning of goods, which is 
historical and culture-specific, that determines the appropriate distribu-
tion of goods.143 In Michael Sandel’s honorific and teleological theory of 
justice, the just distribution of a certain resource depends on its purpose 
and on the values and virtues it honours.144 “The choice between strictly 
egalitarian principles of allocation, principles based on status, time-
                                                  
141  Alexander, supra note 19 at 1049. For Alexander, this “complementarity reasoning” 
means viewing values not “in binary, or zero sum terms, ... [by] choos[ing] one and dis-
card[ing] the other.” Rather, values are “pieces of [a] ... puzzle [that must fit with each 
other]. ... There is no rejection of values, no trumping” (ibid). Values are seen in relation 
with each other. 
142  Michael J Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Strauss 
and Giroux, 2009) at 260.  
143  See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983). 
144  Supra note 142 at 188 (discussing the teleological goals inherent in Aristotle’s example 
that, in distributing flutes, one must seek out the best flute players). 
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related principles, desert or interpersonal comparisons of welfare depends 
on the characteristics of the goods to be allocated.”145  
 Finally, designing a commons requires the analytical ability to identi-
fy which entitlements are core elements of fostering the values we have 
associated with the specific resource and which entitlements can be modi-
fied, added, or dropped to expand access to the resource. We need to crea-
tively configure co-owners’ bundles of entitlements over the common re-
source so as to equalize—and when possible, maximize—the dimension or 
dimensions of autonomy relevant to the particular resource.146 
 In some cases, this resource-specific approach will help avoid or mini-
mize difficult trade-offs. Where forgoing some degree of autonomy is una-
voidable in the commitment to greater equality of autonomy, a resource-
specific analysis will uncover normatively appealing justifications for legal 
rules that impinge on individual co-owners’ autonomy. It will show that 
these sacrifices are not “illiberal”. Rather, they are consistent with a 
thicker, multi-dimensional notion of autonomy.  
 In the next section, I present two applications of this approach. I focus 
on the design of common-ownership regimes for two resources that are 
important preconditions for equality of autonomy, namely affordable 
housing and urban green space. I show how a resource-specific reconfigu-
ration of property entitlements helps to make and justify some of the most 
difficult design decisions that regulators and courts face in outlining the 
legal regime of affordable-housing co-operatives and community gardens.  
                                                  
145  Anna di Robilant, “The Virtues of Common Ownership” (2011) 91:4 BUL Rev 1359 at 
1372. See also Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and 
Necessary Burdens (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992). 
146  See Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home: Property Values Beyond Property Lines 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) (offering an example of this creative recon-
figuration of entitlements). Fennell reconfigures the traditional home ownership bundle 
of rights so as to reflect the many values that homeowners seek from housing as a good 
in the early twenty-first century United States. Residential property not only serves as 
a resource in its own right but also as a placeholder for a quite different set of resources 
such as schools, ambiance, association, etc. Reconfiguring the home ownership bundle 
involves developing new forms of alienable entitlements such as tradable entitlements 
to engage in acts with aesthetic impacts and even tradable entitlements relating to as-
sociation with preferred neighbours. It also involves reconfiguring home ownership in a 
way that decouples the investment volatility associated with off-site factors from the 
homeowner’s bundle: see ibid at 96-119, 173-96.  
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C. Applications 
1. Affordable-Housing Co-operatives 
 As discussed in Part I, affordable-housing co-operatives share the enti-
tlements typical of home ownership between the owner of residential 
property and some outside party representing the interests of a larger 
community, a public entity, or a private non-profit organization. Middle- 
or low-income buyers who meet certain eligibility criteria gain title to res-
idential property. They acquire all the “sticks” of a homeowner: the right 
to use the property (i.e., to occupy it and to make decisions about its 
maintenance and improvement), the right to be immune from having 
their property taken, and the right to transfer (i.e., to pass the property to 
their heirs or to sell it). However, the outside party retains some control of 
both the right to use and the right to transfer. The property is to be occu-
pied by the owner on a continued basis and subletting is restricted. 
Maintenance and improvements are subject to control by the co-
operative’s governing body. The resale price is predetermined or the re-
sale process is controlled, or both. Finally, although the homeowner has 
the right to pass her property to her heirs, the affordable-housing regime 
imposes certain conditions on inheritance, meaning that not every heir 
will have the right to occupy the property.  
 Affordable-housing co-operatives have become an increasingly attrac-
tive response to the shortage of good-quality affordable housing. New 
York has historically been at the forefront of the promotion of affordable-
housing co-operatives. The 1955 Mitchell-Lama Act and then the Urban 
Homestead Assistance Board, an NGO that began in the 1970s during a 
wave of abandonment and foreclosure of buildings, facilitated the conver-
sion of rental housing into affordable-housing co-operatives.147 In recent 
years, many US cities have followed the lead. The city of Berkeley reacted 
to the loss of the rental-housing portion of the city’s inclusionary zoning 
program by supporting the creation of new limited equity housing.148 In 
2009, the Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, LP v. Los Angeles (City of) deci-
                                                  
147  NY Priv Hous Fin Law § 10 (Consol 2012) [Mitchell-Lama Act]; See Gordon D MacDon-
ald & Rosalind Tough, “New York City: Changing Social Values and the New Housing” 
(1963) 39:2 Land Economics 157. 
148  See the documentation available from the Berkeley City Council: memorandum from 
Councilmember Linda Maio to Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council, “Fa-
cilitating Cooperative Home Ownership Units” (10 June 2008), online: City of Berkeley 
<http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3_-_City_Council/2008/06Jun/ 
2008-06-10_Item_11_Facilitating_Cooperative_Home_Ownership_Units.pdf>. For the 
California region generally, see Allan D Heskin & Dewey Bandy, “Limited-Equity 
Housing Cooperatives in California: Proposals for Legislative Reform” (1989) 1:1 CPS 
Brief 1, online: Housing for All <http://www.housingforall.org/lteqhousing.pdf>.  
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sion149 invalidated a city ordinance requiring that twenty per cent of the 
rental units built must be affordable. Similarly, the now-dissolved Chica-
go Mutual Housing Department included the development of shared equi-
ty home ownership in its 2004–2008 affordable-housing plan.150  
 Shared equity home ownership promotes equality of autonomy by 
making housing available to middle- and lower-income individuals and 
families, a fundamental material precondition for autonomy, as well as for 
the relational benefits of an active community of neighbours. According to 
their advocates, shared equity co-operatives perform better than other 
types of subsidized housing in terms of affordability. The co-operative can 
use the entire property to secure up to ninety-eight per cent blanket fi-
nancing because it holds the deed to the property. This arrangement al-
lows for down payments as low as two per cent.151 Most importantly, 
shared equity co-ops preserve affordability over the long term. The equity 
formula that specifies the price at which shares can be resold works to-
gether with the establishment of income maximums for prospective buy-
ers in order to keep the units within the financial reach of predetermined 
income groups. By contrast, programs that use subsidies to sell homes to 
low-income buyers at below-market prices do not preserve the affordabil-
ity of the housing for future buyers, because the unit may subsequently be 
sold at its market price.152 Shared equity co-operatives also perform better 
than other affordable-housing tools in terms of housing quality. Limits on 
use rights, such as the co-operative board’s direct control of maintenance 
decisions, translate into good-quality housing. By contrast, public housing 
has largely failed to deliver decent-quality housing units. The financial 
structure of public housing programs, as well as inadequate funding, has 
led to deferred maintenance and consequent building deterioration.153  
 Second, shared equity co-ops are effective means for equalizing access 
to the relational dimension of autonomy. They facilitate the development 
of vibrant and integrated neighbourhoods. While traditional public hous-
ing has often created conditions of social distress by concentrating the 
                                                  
149  175 Cal App (4th) 1396 (available on WL Can) (App Ct 2009). 
150  See Chicago Mutual Housing Network & University of Illinois at Chicago, Nathalie P 
Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, “Affordable Housing 
Cooperatives: Their Conditions and Prospects in Chicago” (April 2004), online: Housing 
for All <http://housingforall.org/cmht.pdf>. 
151  See ibid at 12. 
152  See Davis, supra note 51 at 90-95. 
153  See Michael H Schill, “Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?” (1993) 
60:2 U Chicago L Rev 497 at 502-503; J Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, “Affordable 
Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed” (2007) 34:2 Fordham 
Urb LJ 527.  
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most disadvantaged segments of the population in segregated ghettos, 
shared equity co-ops have been successful at implementing mixed-income 
housing.154 The participation of mixed-income residents in co-operative 
governance results in higher levels of social integration and stimulates 
community involvement and organization. Third, low monthly occupancy 
and operating costs, combined with home ownership training prior to pur-
chase and foreclosure prevention assistance, ensure security of tenure, 
which in turn promotes neighbourhood stability.155 Finally, shared equity 
co-operatives offer ample opportunity for individual development and ed-
ucation. By participating in management or in democratic co-operative 
governance, members acquire new skills and greater capacity for personal 
mobility.156  
 Limits on the right to use and the right to transfer are crucial in order 
to secure these benefits. At the same time, these limits significantly erode 
co-owners’ negative freedom. Limits on the right to use force owners to re-
linquish independence, shrinking their control over their living space. 
Limits on the right to transfer make exit more costly and curtail owners’ 
ability to build wealth. In other words, the design of shared equity co-ops 
involves a trade-off between full negative freedom for current co-owners 
and greater equality of positive and relational autonomy for the present 
and future generations of lower-income buyers. I believe that grounding 
the commitment to equality of autonomy in the context of housing as a 
specific resource helps us to discern which of these trade-offs may be min-
imized and which are unavoidable but can be justified with normatively 
appealing arguments.  
 In the specific context of housing, restrictions on use are particularly 
troublesome and should be minimized because ample use entitlements are 
crucial to advance the special interests implicated by housing as a re-
source. Arguments that emphasize the special nature of housing are 
prominent in law and policy debates.157 The subjective importance of the 
“home” (i.e., the idea that a home is crucial to an individual’s identity and 
self-expression, serving fundamental interests such as individual liberty, 
privacy, and security), has long pervaded North American culture. It is re-
flected in a wide range of legal doctrines that treat the home as special, 
                                                  
154  See ibid at 567-75; Susan Saegert et al, “Limited Equity Co-ops as Bulwarks Against 
Gentrification” [unpublished, archived at the City University of New York Graduate 
Center], online: The Graduate Center: City University of New York <http://web.gc.cuny. 
edu/che/Lim_Equ_Co-ops.pdf>. 
155  See Davis, supra note 51 at 95-101. 
156  See ibid at 111-14; Kennedy, supra note 54 at 92.  
157  See Iglesias, supra note 66 at 513-14. 
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from criminal law, to landlord and tenant law, to family law.158 Further, 
the idea that housing is a fundamental human right is another central 
theme of housing law and policy discourse. Each individual has a legal 
right to housing that is decent, affordable, and secure. The notion of a 
right to housing is reflected in doctrines such as the implied warranty of 
habitability and in the Fair Housing Act.159 In other words, a home is a 
fundamental need. It is a requirement for a decent life. It satisfies the 
physiological need for shelter and physical safety and stability. Further, it 
satisfies the psychological need for emotional stability, privacy, and iden-
tity or self-expression. These sets of needs are crucial preconditions for 
individuals to be truly autonomous. Ample use rights serve these funda-
mental interests and hence are a core component of the bundle of rights 
pertaining to housing as a resource. 
 A continued occupancy requirement limits an owner’s ability to make 
her own life plans. A home is a necessity because it provides an individual 
with the physical and psychological stability necessary to make autono-
mous choices regarding one’s career, family, interests, and commitments. 
A unit owner may need to be absent for a prolonged period to assist a fam-
ily member, to volunteer in a political or charitable project, or to nurture 
her spirituality by retiring for a year in a monastic community. To be free 
to pursue these options, the owner needs to know that her unit will re-
main available for her and will generate a minimum income to help fi-
nance these projects.  
 While occupancy requirements stifle owners’ material ability to form 
and pursue their life plans, the goal of preserving affordability can be met 
by regulating leasing and subletting. In the scheme that I suggest, the 
leasing or subletting of units is subject to eligibility approval through the 
same procedure that governs approval of new unit owners. Further, to 
preserve affordability, there is a cap imposed on the amount of rent that 
owners may charge. Finally, this rent is shared between the unit owner 
and the sponsor or the co-operative. The former is granted a fair return on 
her investment in the unit, including the value added by any improve-
ments. The latter retains the surplus, if any, that is determined by factors 
beyond the owner’s control (e.g., changes in the region’s economy or in 
zoning law).160 This design enables mobility for the owner, availability of 
the unit for other low-income applicants during the owner’s absence, and 
allocation of the surplus portion of the rent to the sponsor or the co-
                                                  
158  See ibid at 533-34. 
159  42 USC § 3601 ff.; Iglesias, supra note 66 at 544. See also Frank I Michelman, “The Ad-
vent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal” (1970) 5:2 Harv CR-CLL Rev 207 
[Michelman, “Right to Housing”]. 
160  See Kennedy & Specht, supra note 54 at 271. 
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operative. The sponsor or co-operative can then invest the surplus in the 
project by subsidizing new units or improving the facilities.161 
 Another set of limits on the owner’s right to use relates to mainte-
nance and improvements. Unit owners are required to maintain their 
homes in good repair and are subject to control over the improvements 
they choose to make to increase the use value or the resale value of their 
units. Maintenance requirements are deemed necessary to preserve the 
habitability of the unit and to avoid major repair costs for the next low-
income buyer who will someday purchase the unit.162 Standards of good 
repair may be minimalist, requiring maintenance according to local build-
ing codes or insurance specifications. Standards of good repair may also 
be more demanding according to neighbourhood compatibility. In the 
scheme that I propose, owners are required to maintain their property in 
compliance with the local regulations. This maintenance requirement is 
preferable to the others because it simply reflects the duties imposed by 
legislation on all homeowners. It does not delegate the power to set 
maintenance standards to private insurance companies, and it does not 
impose more demanding requirements that might be justified in a condo-
minium or a subdivision, but which would burden low-income owners.  
 Limiting the improvements that owners may choose to make to avoid 
gold plating163 is typical of limited equity home ownership. Limits usually 
concern both the type of improvements allowed and the value that these 
improvements add to the owner’s equity. In the strictest scheme, the 
sponsor’s prior approval is required to ensure quality control, but once 
approved, none of these improvements add to the owner’s equity or to the 
resale price. In the most liberal schemes, prior approval is not required, 
and the sponsor of the co-op board determines which improvements will 
be credited toward the owner’s equity. Critics of shared equity schemes 
argue that these limits force owners to relinquish their independence, 
leaving them with “too little choice and too little control over their per-
sonal living space.”164 The ability to determine improvements free from 
external control is an important outlet for self-expression that allows the 
                                                  
161  What is sacrificed under this scheme is the ability of the owner to secure the transform-
ative benefits that come with continued residency and involvement in the residents’ 
community. But emotional stability, a sense of home, and civic engagement, while 
transformative, cannot be paternalistically imposed on low-income owners. Contrary to 
the material stability that comes from being able to rely on the continued availability of 
one’s unit, these benefits are highly subjective, not necessarily linked to a real estate 
unit, and also may be derived from other sources. 
162  See Davis, supra note 51 at 60-61. 
163 See Kennedy, supra note 54 (defining gold plating as “improvements that make the unit 
unaffordable” at 100). 
164  Davis, supra note 51 at 90. 
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owner to maximize the use value of her home. It is also a means for 
wealth creation as the owner’s investment is typically reflected in the ap-
preciated market value of the home. On the other hand, costly improve-
ments or major overhauls might increase the price of the unit beyond 
what would be affordable for future buyers of modest means.165 
 The trade-off in this case can be minimized. The sponsor or the co-op 
can publish a list of pre-approved improvements, the value of which is 
credited toward the owner’s equity. The credit is calculated based on the 
change in the property value as a result of the improvement. This mecha-
nism preserves the owner’s autonomy in that it allows relatively ample 
opportunities for self-expression and some degree of wealth creation. Also, 
it is not more stringent than the limits faced by a great number of owners 
of market-rate residential property, for example in condominium com-
plexes or subdivisions where architectural committees exert a variety of 
quality and aesthetic controls. The owner retains the ability to design and 
control living space by choosing among a variety of pre-approved func-
tional and aesthetic improvements. What is foregone is the opportunity to 
receive credit for improvements that are luxuries, such as a Jacuzzi or 
Italian mosaic tiles. The ability to make luxurious improvements, howev-
er, is not crucial for self-expression when other reasonable options for per-
sonalizing the home are available. The owner also retains some ability to 
generate wealth by investing in the improvement of her home. The value 
credited toward the owner’s equity depends not on the investment but ra-
ther on the actual increase in the unit’s market value. This arrangement 
subjects owners of shared equity housing to the same risks that any 
homeowner faces. Even in market-rate housing, homeowners are not 
guaranteed a return on their investments. It is the market that deter-
mines which improvements increase the property’s appraised value and 
by how much.  
 Regulating subletting and pre-approving specific improvements are 
ways to minimize the trade-offs and to fit the different dimensions of 
owners’ autonomy together. By contrast, limits on the right to transfer are 
more difficult to minimize. “A resale formula establishes an upper limit on 
the price for which ... [the unit] may be resold — whether it is sold back to 
a sponsoring organization [or the co-op] or sold directly by one homeowner 
to another.”166 Resale formulas vary significantly, but they “are [usually] 
designed to allow homeowners to recoup their original downpayment, to 
recover any payments that have gone toward the amortization of their 
mortgage, and to realize a reasonable return on the homeowner’s invest-
                                                  
165  See Iglesias, supra note 66 at 526-27. 
166  Davis, supra note 51 at 64. 
                                 COMMON OWNERSHIP AND EQUALITY OF AUTONOMY  307 
 
 
ment.”167 These limits are the very design features that make it possible to 
preserve affordability over many years. They are unavoidable. Nonethe-
less, they significantly affect owners. They deprive owners of the full 
wealth-generating benefits of home ownership. Home ownership is a 
source of wealth in that it builds savings for households that otherwise 
might not be able to put money aside for the future. Home ownership also 
creates opportunities for capital gains when real estate markets are ris-
ing.  
 Scholars and policy-makers who believe in the potential of shared eq-
uity home ownership downplay the negative effects of these limits on 
owners’ negative and positive freedom with a variety of arguments. First, 
they argue that most owners do build wealth during their time in shared 
equity housing despite resale restrictions.168 Second, experts point to the 
fact that low-income owners of market-rate housing often build very little 
wealth through home ownership. Since the market-rate housing that low-
income people can afford tends to be old, in need of repair, and located in 
depressed areas, there is little or no market appreciation. Moreover, “low-
income homeowners can only extract wealth from their homes if they are 
able to hang on to them for many years ... [and] to trade up to bigger and 
better housing over time. Too often, they do neither.”169 Third, advocates 
of shared equity home ownership argue that the limited equity gained at 
the time of resale is compensated by a variety of other benefits to owners. 
Owners still benefit from the “transformative” effects of home owner-
ship:170 home ownership helps low-income people “to improve their class 
standing, social status, the kind of community they live in, and the quali-
                                                  
167  Ibid at 65. 
168  A recent study of the Burlington Community Land Trust showed that homeowners re-
alized a very respectable seventeen to twenty per cent return over a span of fourteen 
years when reselling their homes under one resale formula (John Emmeus Davis & 
Amy Demetrowitz, Permanently Affordable Homeownership: Does the Community Land 
Trust Deliver on Its Promises? A Performance Evaluation of the CLT Model Using Re-
sale Data from the Burlington Community Land Trust (Burlington, Vt: Burlington 
Community Land Trust, 2003) at 18, table 5, online: Community-Wealth.org <http:// 
www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/clts/report-davis.pdf>). The study 
also found that, while owners of market rate homes earned a thirty-two per cent return 
under normal conditions, owners of limited equity housing earned twenty-nine per cent 
(ibid at 19, table 6). Both of these analyses note that these returns far exceed what 
owners would have realized had they put their money into a low-risk investment like a 
mutual fund (ibid at 20).  
169  Davis, supra note 51 at 8. 
170  See Thomas M Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth Per-
petuates Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 1-18, 183-99 (discussing 
transformative assets). 
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ty of their children’s schools.”171 Further, owners enjoy greater stability of 
tenure than low-income owners of market-rate housing, as well as greater 
opportunities for social life and civic engagement. These aspects “might be 
just as important as wealth creation in improving the lives of low-income 
[people].”172 
 While these arguments are powerful, a more transparent defence of 
the limited right to transfer is to admit that the restriction is a significant 
one but also to argue that this choice is justified by the commitment to 
equalizing autonomy rather than maximizing it for some. Again, it is the 
special characteristics and interests implicated by the housing as a re-
source that justifies this outcome.  
 Housing is an economic good that is produced and exchanged on the 
market.173 The investment value of a home is derived from both the in-
crease in property value through appreciation and the long-term savings 
compared to renting due to the effects of inflation. Appreciation in the 
market value of housing may be supplemented by the owner’s personal 
contribution of money and labour toward improvement of the property. 
What arguments about housing as an economic good obscure, however, is 
the fact that much of the appreciation is caused “by societal factors out-
side of the homeowner’s control, ... [where] public investment in the city 
as a whole, private investment in the surrounding neighbourhood, chang-
es in the regional economy, and changes in the way residential real estate 
is regulated, financed, and taxed” are among the main factors.174  
 Who deserves the surplus portion of the property’s market value that 
reflects external societal factors? “Lockean theory has been plagued from 
the start by the difficulty of justifying a private right to that portion of the 
market price that reflects [societal factors and] scarcity rents.”175 How do 
we get from the Lockean principle that we own what we mix with our la-
bour to the enrichment of the full market value of our property, including 
rents? The moral appeal of the Lockean theory “lies in its promise of ‘pro-
portion between remuneration and exertion.’”176 But the price that a 
house fetches on the market results from market scarcity and other socie-
tal factors outside owner exertion. Arguably, the owner owns only the 
                                                  
171  Davis, supra note 51 at 105. 
172  Ibid. 
173  See Iglesias, supra note 66 at 514. 
174  Davis, supra note 51 at 65. 
175  Barbara Fried, “Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick’s ‘Justice in Transfer’ and the 
Problem of Market-Based Distribution” (1995) 24:3 Phil & Pub Aff 226 at 230. 
176  Ibid at 228, citing John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy (Kitchener: 
Batoche Books, 2001) at 237. 
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value that equals her investment in the property, plus a fair return. Soci-
ety has a claim on the rest. If a significant portion of the value belongs to 
society, then limiting the limited equity co-operative member’s ability to 
pocket the full equity at the moment of resale appears less difficult to jus-
tify. 
 A limited right to transfer is also justified because housing is a fun-
damental need. The US Supreme Court has long been “imbued with ... the 
idea of housing as a need of outstanding importance, capable of generat-
ing unconventional legal claims.”177 As early as 1921, the court held that 
“[h]ousing is a necessary of life.”178 If housing is a resource of fundamental 
significance to humans, then it should be provided to all. Securing hous-
ing for individuals requires more than simply the negative assurance that 
housing will be available without arbitrary interference and according to 
the market rules normally governing access to goods. Rather, securing 
housing also requires the positive provision of means for the acquisition of 
housing, be it the provision of specific housing in kind or the provision of 
rent supplements.  
 The “right to housing” claim is distributive in essence. Socio-economic 
rights claims are distributive claims packaged in politically palatable 
rhetoric.179 The term “right” suggests a “correlative duty on the part of an-
other party, usually the state, to recognize and provide for what the right 
entails.”180 Making a plain distributive argument has advantages over 
couching the argument in the language of rights. First, it dispels the 
vagueness of rights claims and forces us to confront a number of more 
                                                  
177  Michelman, “Right to Housing”, supra note 159 at 210.  
178  Block v Hirsh, 256 US 135 at 156, 41 S Ct 458 (1921). 
179  See memorandum from Talha Syed to Anna di Robilant, “Rights Arguments: An Ana-
lytics” [nd]. Syed notes that 
 [t]he following is the typical form taken by assertions of positive, socio-
economic rights (at least when they are presented lucidly): “X is a fundamen-
tal need of all humans, and therefore all persons have a right to X.” Thus, 
there are two parts: (1) the identification of some candidate X as being of 
fundamental significance for all humans; and (2) an assertion that what 
should follow normatively from (1) is the provision of such goods to all per-
sons “as a matter of right.” Regarding (1), the candidates can be anything 
from “minimum level of food,” to “basic health care,” to “decent shel-
ter/housing,” to “a job”—what unites them is that they are claimed to be 
“basic” physical or institutional goods, with “basic” meaning required for all 
humans to have a “decent” life. The second unifying feature of such claims is 
that securing the good(s) for individuals is understood to require more than 
simply the (negative) assurance of the absence of coercive interference in 
pursuit of such goods; rather, also needed is the (positive) provision of re-
sources or other means for the acquisition of such goods (ibid at 3). 
180  Iglesias, supra note 66 at 541. 
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concrete questions. “Right to housing” claims often take the form of simple 
assertions. By contrast, “housing as a need” engages a series of informa-
tive questions: How intense is this need? How much housing is needed? 
How relative or idiosyncratic should the standard to determine whether 
the housing is adequate be? And further, how absolute should the assur-
ance that this need will be satisfied be?181 Second, it avoids the easy rebut-
tal that the political-moral claim of a right to housing is only weakly re-
flected in legal-institutional materials (i.e., that “courts and legislatures 
have stopped short of recognizing a full-blown individual right to hous-
ing”).182  
2.  Community Gardens 
 Community gardens are another form of common ownership with the 
potential to promote greater equality of autonomy by making green space, 
and the social, environmental, and health benefits that it provides, avail-
able to residents of distressed communities on a more equal basis. Sur-
prisingly, community gardens have received little attention from property 
scholars. Community gardens arise “when [citizens] ... grow food, flowers, 
or greenery on [vacant urban land] ... that they do not own.”183 Communi-
ty gardens may be considered a form of common ownership because own-
ership entitlements are split. A municipality, land reserve agency, or land 
trust holds title as a public entity or private owner. Gardeners hold use 
rights, often forming a community-garden organization that takes the 
form of an unincorporated association or a non-profit corporation.184 The 
broad outline of the ownership arrangement of community gardens is of-
ten set forth in state legislation or local ordinances. Typically, the munici-
pality or other public or private titleholder leases the land to the garden-
ers’ association for a nominal fee or license. The lease is often short-term, 
and it may contain a clause that allows the public or private owner to re-
gain possession of the land at any time.185 Often, the public entity also as-
                                                  
181  See Michelman, “Right to Housing”, supra note 159 at 207-208. 
182  Iglesias, supra note 66 at 549. See Michelman, “Right to Housing”, supra note 159 at 
209. 
183  Jane E Schukoske, “Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local Pol-
icies Transforming Urban Open Space” (2000) 3:2 NYUJ Legis & Pub Pol’y 351 at 354-
55. See generally Adrianne C Crow, “Developing Community Gardens: Removing Bar-
riers to Improve Our Society” (2009-10) 2:2 Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture & 
Natural Resource Law 219; Dorothy A Borrelli, “Filling the Void: Applying a Place-
Based Ethic to Community Gardens” (2008) 9:2 VJEL 271 at 273-75. 
184  See Schukoske, supra note 183 at 365-71. 
185  See ibid (noting that the “duration of garden lot leases is specified in various authoriz-
ing laws, and ranges from as long as five years ... in Seattle, to two years in Boston, to 
as short as one growing season under New York law.” Some of these leases are “termi-
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sumes the duty of providing material support and assistance to the gar-
deners.186  
 Gardeners’ use rights are subject to a variety of requirements and du-
ties. Typically, there are entry rules. The gardeners may be required to 
demonstrate a purpose including agriculture, gardening, or economic de-
velopment. They may also be required to prove that the association has 
operated for at least a year and has a history of community gardening, or 
that the association is sponsored by a recognized community-gardening 
organization. Another frequent entry requirement is need.187 Local ordi-
nances governing community gardens may assign priority to needy indi-
viduals and families when allocating the lots. Gardeners’ income rights 
(i.e., the right to derive income from the gardening activity) are also lim-
ited. Under most local ordinances, produce grown in the community gar-
dens may not be sold.188 Further, gardeners have duties. Most important-
ly, most community-gardens statutes require the gardeners’ association to 
obtain property insurance and general liability insurance, and to accept 
“liability for injury or damage resulting from the use of the land for com-
munity gardening.”189  
 Community gardens have been an important and visible feature of 
American cities since the 1980s.190 The New York City Green Thumb pro-
ject is probably the most well-known example of community gardens or at 
least the one that has attracted the greatest media attention.191 Many of 
      
nable on short notice.” For example, “[t]he Adopt-A-Lot program in Baltimore, Mary-
land ... provides renewable one-year leases, but the city reserves the right to terminate 
the agreement upon thirty days notice to use the lot for another public purpose, and up-
on five days notice in the event of complaints concerning the use of or conditions of the 
lot” at 365 [footnotes omitted]). See also Crow, supra note 183 at 229; Borrelli, supra 
note 183 at 282-83. 
186  See Schukoske, supra note 183 at 376 (noting that under the New York statutory 
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the gardens in New York City were created at the time of the fiscal crisis 
of the 1970s, when thousands of housing units scattered around the city 
were abandoned by their owners and eventually acquired by the city. 
There was no money to clear the lots because the city was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Buildings deteriorated and collapsed, and the depressed 
market meant that few lots were sold. The gardens were formed by local 
residents reacting to the degeneration of their neighbourhoods, often with 
no city authorization. The city began to recognize the gardens legally, and 
in 1978, it established the Green Thumb project, which offered leases and 
assistance to the gardeners. The gardens became the object of much pub-
lic controversy in the late 1990s, when the city sought to auction off the 
gardens land for residential and commercial developments.192  
 Community gardens foster greater equality of autonomy by securing 
access to important material preconditions for autonomy such as green 
space, clean air, and healthy food for residents of poor and minority 
neighbourhoods.193 Green space and clean air are scarce and distributed 
unequally. Civil rights organizations and environmental law experts have 
raised the question of environmental racism (i.e., concern over the une-
qual distribution of environmental burdens and benefits).194 In their effort 
to prevent the auctioning of the Green Thumb gardens, the New York 
City gardeners emphasized the unequal distribution of green space. In 
New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, the plaintiff 
claimed that a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s regulatory 
scheme had occurred because the sale of the gardens had a disproportion-
ately adverse impact on the city’s African American, Asian American, and 
Hispanic populations.195  
 Community gardens also boost residents’ relational dimension of au-
tonomy. They promote the development of vibrant and active communi-
ties. Community gardens are crucial triggers of what scholars call a 
neighbourhood’s “social capital”. The term “social capital” describes “fea-
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tures of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”196 Some schol-
ars contend that “there are no substitutes for community gardens” in 
terms of community creation and revitalization.197 In the struggle against 
New York City garden auctions, the city’s greening community argued 
that the gardens are more than patches of green in the city. They are 
spaces where the residents of marginalized areas can gather and mobilize. 
As a green activist put it, the gardens are “a space of democracy, with a 
little ‘d’.”198  
 Why is equality of autonomy best promoted through common owner-
ship of urban gardens, rather than through other means, such as regula-
tion and zoning? First, land-use experts note that traditional zoning is of-
ten unsuccessful in protecting a community’s social capital. Traditional 
zoning fails to take into account the consequences that development pro-
jects have on the social fabric of the surrounding community because 
land-use regulation and decisions often happen in a highly individualized 
and ad hoc fashion rather than through a public deliberative process.199 As 
Shelia Foster argues, “The liberal use of zoning amendments and vari-
ances situate private [developers’] interests ... as ... the main [influence] ... 
on land use decisions.” This dynamic “frustrate[s] efforts by communities 
to influence the design of new projects in a way that makes them compat-
ible with the social and economic systems in the community.”200 “Green 
zoning” provisions that mandate the creation of urban green spaces are 
also often inadequate. They tend to leave the responsibility for greening to 
individuals rather than fostering social capital.201 Further, implementa-
tion of green zoning often requires, but lacks, significant funding and 
strict enforcement.202 Most importantly, environmental justice scholars 
and activists note that zoning fails to protect low-income and minority 
communities. Zoning often functions as a vehicle for environmental rac-
ism rather than as a remedy to it. Without organizational resources and 
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political visibility, poor minority communities fail to secure zoning protec-
tion.203  
 While community gardening may be seen as a spontaneous and self-
organized community action that succeeds where traditional land-use 
regulation has failed, the success of community gardens depends on the 
design of their ownership structure. The shape and distribution of co-
owners’ entitlements has to enable stability both for the gardeners and 
flexibility for the titleholder. Community gardens need permanence in or-
der to deliver their promised benefits: a garden’s success cannot be meas-
ured in one season. Cultivation and the creation of social capital happen 
over time. On the other hand, the municipality or public entity needs to 
have a substantial degree of flexibility to reassess priorities for the use of 
scarce vacant urban land. Eventually, the public authority may need to 
convert the land occupied by gardens to other uses that benefit the com-
munity at large or disadvantaged segments of the community. For exam-
ple, the garden may be the most suitable land, or the only land, available 
for affordable-housing developments.  
 Once again, the central design question seems to concern exit, and al-
lowing exit involves a difficult trade-off. In affordable-housing co-ops, exit 
involves a trade-off between full autonomy for current co-owners, who to 
be fully autonomous, need to be able to use and transfer their units freely, 
and greater equality of autonomy for low-income buyers, whose need for 
good-quality affordable housing is best satisfied by limiting the use rights 
and transfer rights of current co-owners. In the case of community gar-
dens, exit may often involve a trade-off between greater equality of auton-
omy for residents of a distressed neighbourhood who seek greater access 
to green space and its benefits, and greater equality of autonomy for low-
income people who are homeless or have inadequate housing.  
 The success of community gardens as a means of fostering more equal 
access to clean air, healthy food, and an active social life requires the limi-
tation of the municipality’s ability to exit the common-ownership scheme. 
Specifically, such success requires longer leases, with renewal or exten-
sion clauses and without clauses allowing the city to regain possession of 
the gardens upon short notice. By making exit more difficult for the city, 
however, these design features limit the city’s ability to respond to chang-
ing public needs (e.g., the development of new affordable-housing units).  
 The struggle between New York City’s municipal government and its 
community gardeners illustrates this tragic trade-off. In Giuliani, the city 
claimed that its plan to develop new housing and facilities for medical and 
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related services on garden land constituted a legitimate justification for 
its actions. The city noted that it would devote some of the redeveloped 
land to affordable housing. In the course of the litigation, however, it 
emerged that the city had no concrete plan for the provision of affordable 
housing.204 While the city may have overstated its commitment to develop-
ing affordable housing, “[p]olicies favoring environmental protection [and 
the preservation of open green space] … are often assumed to conflict with 
... [affordable-housing projects].”205 This conflict arises because “[b]oth af-
fordable housing and ... green space ... require the same scarce resource, 
urban land.”206 Moreover, affordable housing and community green space 
are important preconditions for autonomy, and access to both is often 
framed in the language of rights.207 “Right to housing” arguments have 
long been a part of housing debates and policies, and the idea of a right to 
green space is gaining prominence in land-use debates. For example, New 
York City gardeners have relied heavily on rights arguments that “[place] 
an absolute value on green space.”208 Because they both require the use of 
scarce vacant land, equalizing access to housing in an urban setting 
seems to come at the expense of equalizing access to green space.209  
 In Giuliani, both the district court and the court of appeals insisted on 
the incompatibility between the goal of providing new housing and the 
goal of protecting the gardens. Both courts privileged the former over the 
latter. The district court denied a preliminary injunction seeking to pre-
vent the city from selling the gardens. The court recognized that the gar-
dening community would suffer irreparable harm and declared itself 
“sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ needs and concerns.” It went on to state, 
however, that “the City is acting in the public interest in creating afforda-
ble housing, market-rate housing units, elderly medical- and related-care 
facilities and other community or municipal facilities, including commer-
cial space in neighborhoods which are predominantly minority and low-
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income.”210 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district 
court. It held that the city’s plan to build new housing constituted a sub-
stantial legitimate justification for the city’s action and that the plaintiff 
had failed to show a less discriminatory option was available to achieve 
the city’s legitimate governmental goals.211  
 The trade-off between equal access to green space and equal access to 
housing need not be inevitable. If the New York courts had a more plural-
istic understanding of the values implicated by the resource of urban land, 
then they could have minimized the trade-off. The New York courts could 
have expanded their discussion of the use of vacant urban land beyond 
economic or development values to include ecological, social, and ethical 
concerns. That expanded discussion would have drawn on existing legal 
materials, as well as new scholarly work and emerging social movements. 
Instead, both courts’ decisions reflected a narrow vision of land-use plan-
ning that is governed by an economic ethic. The gardens were character-
ized as vacant land: a scarce resource that had to be developed for the 
most valuable use, namely high-end and affordable residential use, and 
commercial use. The New York courts thus failed to recognize that the 
meaning and value of urban land has been broadened in recent decades. 
Courts, scholars, and policy-makers have developed a plurality of urban 
land ethics. These new land ethics focus on the complexity of the interac-
tion between physical, biological, and social processes in urban environ-
ments. They emphasize the need to develop urban land by preserving and 
integrating different uses. The creation of urban green space is a central 
theme of the new land ethics.212 
 An environmental ethic of urban land use emerged as early as the 
1970s. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its state coun-
terparts required that agencies assess the impact of a proposed land use 
on the “human environment”.213 As a more recent example, the environ-
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mental ethic of urban land use underlies the wave of “smart growth” or 
“new urbanism” state and local land use laws that seek to balance urban 
development with environmental protection and sustainability.214  
 While the environmental ethic has largely focused on physical aspects 
of land use, other ethics are emerging that place emphasis on less-
palpable aesthetic, ethical, and social aspects of urban land use. For ex-
ample, an ethic that underscores the social significance of city space is 
emerging.215 The ability of people who share a space in big cities to share 
in small-scale, everyday aspects of public life fosters well-being and self-
respect. A community with sufficient amounts of social capital can also 
“‘purchase’ many other social (and economic) resources that create and 
sustain healthy neighbourhoods.”216  
 Urban land-use decisions can either strengthen or undermine a com-
munity’s social capital. Legal scholars who embrace a social ethic of urban 
land suggest that courts’ broad interpretations of NEPA and smart 
growth zoning ordinances have not gone far enough. These interpreta-
tions have failed to fully grapple with the burdens that land-use decisions 
impose on the social ties and networks within a community. These schol-
ars argue that legal doctrine, regulation, and policy regarding urban land 
use should recognize the integration between land use and social relations 
in urban environments.217 
 These emerging plural ethics suggest a shift in the way urban land is 
valued. They underscore that equal access to the environmental, aesthet-
ic, and social benefits of urban green space is important for human flour-
ishing. It is an important precondition for equality of autonomy. Had the 
New York courts acknowledged this new approach to the resource of ur-
ban land, they could have designed a different ownership scheme for 
community gardens that minimizes the tragic trade-off between goods 
that are all important preconditions for equality of autonomy.  
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 Following a lawsuit by State Attorney General Spitzer in 2002, the 
city and the gardeners reached a compromise agreement.218 The agree-
ment provides a glimpse of how ownership entitlements could be shaped 
to allow community gardens to be successful. It could provide a model for 
local governments seeking to implement common ownership for communi-
ty gardens. As we have seen, the crucial question is with respect to exit 
(i.e., the terms of the lease between the public entity holding title to the 
land and the gardeners or gardening associations). The agreement out-
lined a regime where the city has relatively ample exit rights, but the 
gardeners retain a degree of security.  
 Importantly, the agreement granted Green Thumb leases to gardens 
not yet registered.219 While cities prefer revocable licenses with gardeners 
rather than leases, leases give gardeners greater security of tenure. In 
Giuliani, it was easy for the court to find that a license revocable at will 
did not provide the gardeners with a legally cognizable interest for stand-
ing to challenge decisions affecting the use of the gardens.  
 The agreement did not modify the term of the leases, but an ideal 
ownership scheme would feature terms long enough to elicit commitment 
by gardeners and to realize the social and health benefits of the gardens. 
A three- to five-year renewable lease of public lands affords a substantial 
period of time for the planning and implementation of the gardens. At the 
same time, a three- to five-year term would not hinder the governmental 
lessor’s ability to plan for another use of the land, if needed. For example, 
some have noted that three years is well within the time span required to 
get new residential construction approved in New York City.220 Addition-
ally, a community garden ordinance may “provide for the possibility of 
permanent dedication to the parks department after [three to five] ... 
years’ continuous use as a community garden.”221  
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 The need to achieve a good balance between stability for the gardens 
and flexibility for the city or other public entity also weighs against re-
newal or extension clauses that would lengthen the lease beyond the rec-
ommended three to five years. Covenants giving gardeners the power to 
be tenants for one or more terms beyond the end of the original term 
would increase the gardeners’ security of tenure. Such covenants, howev-
er, would be too restrictive a limit on the city’s exit rights. They would 
limit the city’s ability to respond to new needs.  
 For the same reason, clauses allowing the city to terminate the 
agreement and repossess the land may be an important flexibility-
enhancing feature. Garden advocates have largely viewed such clauses 
unfavourably because of their potential to severely undermine the stabil-
ity of the gardens; however, such a position might not always be justified. 
Termination clauses should be coupled with duties imposed on the city. In 
case of termination, the city would be required to find alternate space for 
the gardens to the extent possible.  
 Section 8 of the agreement provides a promising model of an effective 
termination clause. First, it compels the city to provide alternate space for 
several gardens in the Bronx slated for development. Additionally, it re-
quires the city to provide cleanup services and assistance with the pro-
curement of alternate sites for the gardens by providing a list of other 
available vacant lots, if any, within one-half mile of the existing garden. Fi-
nally, the city is also obligated to restore any damage caused to garden 
lots planned for preservation that are disturbed by adjacent construction 
projects. Easier, flexibility-enhancing exit for the city should also be bal-
anced with a duty to assist new gardeners in land preparation and by 
providing access to water. Studies have shown that access to resources is 
important to the success of the gardens. For example, installing a water 
line can be both expensive and time consuming.222  
 A local community-garden ordinance allowing easy exit for the local 
government or public agency, coupled with duties to find alternative space 
as well as duties of assistance would minimize the tragic trade-off be-
tween green space and affordable housing. However, it would not com-
pletely avoid these trade-offs. Urban land is a scarce resource, and the 
need for good-quality affordable housing is pressing. In many instances, 
some green space will be lost. Alternative space of a similar size and with 
similar characteristics may not be available. Allowing easy exit coupled 
with duties, however, would at least trigger a conversation among the ac-
tors involved, namely the municipal government, gardeners, residents, 
and affordable-housing organizations. Such a conversation could address 
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fundamental questions such as how intense the competing needs are, how 
access to green space can be assured, and by what standard the adequacy 
of green space should be determined. 
Conclusions 
 In this article, I have argued that we should expand the focus of the 
commons debate to include equality of autonomy. In political theory, as 
well as in the public imagination, the commons have long been associated 
with notions of equality and inclusiveness. We should restore these ideas 
to contemporary commons discourse. In times of high inequality and eco-
nomic instability, common-ownership regimes such as land trusts, limited 
equity housing co-operatives, neighbourhood-managed parks, and com-
munity-sustained agriculture have the potential to make resources that 
are crucial to individuals’ autonomy available on a more equitable basis. 
Further, I have argued that a resource-specific analysis of property enti-
tlements helps make and justify the difficult choices we often face in de-
signing common-ownership schemes that seek to promote equality of au-
tonomy.  
 The two claims that I made in this article concern normative orienta-
tion and institutional design. I have not weighed in on the larger question 
of whether, as some progressive scholars believe, “a very large extension 
of the commons framework is the way to resurrect an alternative narra-
tive of social inclusion and direct satisfaction of social rights.”223 Nor have 
I discussed the fear some have expressed that the generalized enthusiasm 
for the commons may hide new forms of social control and exploitation.224 
I believe that the question of whether common ownership is desirable and 
effective depends on the resource: on the characteristics and also on the 
values and interests that the resource implicates. Generalized enthusiasm 
for common-ownership regimes must be tempered by a sensitivity to the par-
ticulars of the resource, in order to make informed decisions about the values 
and interests that society wishes to promote with respect to a given resource 
and the kind of property rights that will best give effect to these societal 
goals. 
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